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INTRODUCTION
In November 2019, news broke of yet another violent exchange between
the Israeli military and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza. The conflict
began with what appeared to be a routine targeting sequence directed at a PIJ
military training complex in the Palestinian town of Deir al-Balah.
Unfortunately, this standard military practice quickly turned deadly after a
civilian family of eight was accidently targeted and killed.1 A number of
intelligence errors are thought to have caused this tragedy:
(1) the site in question was originally designated an infrastructure target,
but after that original designation, no review of changes at the complex were
considered, including whether the site still served the purposes of the Islamic
Jihad;2
(2) as was later confirmed, at no stage was the area checked for the
presence of civilians;3
(3) the fact that a family of herders used the series of shacks at the site as a
home for quite some time prior to the incident was never properly identified;4
(4) immediately following the incident, an Israeli Arabic-language
spokesperson falsely claimed that the operation targeted Rasmi Abu Malhous,
who was said to be in charge of the PIJs rocket squadrons in central Gaza. In
reality, no such individual was ever known to the intelligence community, and it
seems that the false statement was based on unreliable information shared on
social media.5
1.
See Yaniv Kubovich & Jack Khoury, Israeli Army Admits to Killing Eight Gaza Family
Members: We Thought the House Was Empty, HAARETZ (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/
middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-israeli-army-admits-strike-that-killed-palestinian-familyintended-for-empty-house-1.8129435?lts=1609615472518.
2.
See Yaniv Kubovich & Jack Khoury, Outdated Intelligence, Social Media Rumors: Behind
Israels Killing of Gaza Family, HAARETZ (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/.premium-outdated-intelligence-social-media-rumors-behind-israel-s-killing-of-gaza-family1.8131101.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id. See also TOI Staff, IDF Defends Intel for Gaza Strike that Killed 9 Palestinian Civilians,
THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-defends-intel-for-gaza-strike-
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Israeli officials later claimed that this was an innocent mistake, while
admitting that the way the incident was handled and made public was
unprofessional.6
It is common for militaries to brush incidents like this aside as unintended
mistakes, incidental to the fog of war. But it is a short road from designating
an incident as unintentional to subsequently then designating it as
unavoidable. Troublingly, the unavoidable then becomes irreprehensible,
understandable, and ultimately defensible. Herein lies the danger. Wartime
errors that cause avoidable civilian harms are allowed to pass with impunity.
Under the current legal landscape, civilian victims are left with no recourse to
seek compensation, let alone justice. This Article aims to redefine when
governments should be held internationally responsible and civilly liable for
intelligence faults that result in civilian harm. When a country, like Israel, fails
to meet the necessary duty of care in handling its intelligence, such professional
negligence should result in a legal duty to provide compensation to the victims,
like the family in Deir al-Balah. Instead of setting such a legal standard, however,
our current willingness to name these errors as mere mistakes results in a
reaffirmation cycle that only hinders our ability to draw moral or legal lines.
James Dawes once wrote that the very act of naming produces an other
by instituting violent binaries.7 If naming produces violence, as Dawes
suggests, then intelligence agencies are in the most violent of all naming
industries. After all, the work of the wartime intelligence analyst is to
continuously name, categorize, and label. In the morning, the analyst inserts
geographical coordinates into a database indicating a military target based on
certain signals intelligence.8 Right before lunch, the analyst produces a detailed
memo on the side-dealings of some civilian farmer, branding her with a new title:
a direct participant in hostilities.9 By evening, the analyst uses predictive

that-killed-9-palestinian-civilians/. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) did conclude that military activity
had been conducted in the compound in the past. The IDF initially estimated that civilians would not
be harmed as a result of an attack, but post-attack reviews concluded that the compound was not closed
off, and in reality civilians were present there. The army said its investigation included
recommendations on how to avoid such irregular events in the future, but didnt give further details.
The Associated Press later reported that Rasmis brother, who they claimed was an Islamic Jihad
commander, lived in the home, but they said that he was not there at the time of the strike. Id.
6.
Kubovich & Khoury, supra note 2.
7.
James R. Dawes, Language, Violence, and Human Rights Law, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMANS.
215, 215 (1999).
8.
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Off Target: The Conduct of War and Civilian Causalities
in Iraq (Dec. 11, 2003), https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/12/11/target/conduct-war-and-civiliancasualties-iraq (noting that the U.S. used an unsound targeting methodology that relied on intercepts of
satellite phones and inadequate corroborating intelligence. The report goes further to suggest that the
techniques flaws were compounded by lack of sufficient analysis pre- and post-attacks.).
9.
See, e.g., Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the
Protections of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, art. 13, adopted June 8, 1977, entered into
force Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S 609 [hereinafter APII] (The civilian population and individual civilians
shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations.... The civilian
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.... Civilians shall enjoy
the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.). For
further analysis of particular legal ambiguities resulting from this general rule, see NILS MELZER,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, ICRC (2009) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretive Guidance on DPH].
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algorithms to identify individuals susceptible to recruitment by alleged terrorist
organizations, thus marking them for future questioning and potential
administrative detention.10
Our review wouldnt be complete, though, if we only focused on the way
the intelligence community names its targets. We must also critically examine
the language that intelligence professionals use to label their own successes and
failures. After all, describing something as a mere mistake sends a signal. It is
true, of course, that some faults are rooted in unavoidable capacity limitations.
An intelligence agencys assessments are only as good as the budgetary
resources at its disposal, the human resources that it employs, and the
intelligence resources it had already cultivated. These limitations are outside the
scope of this Article, as they are ones for which no liability could ensue.
There is, however, another set of possible explanations for suboptimal
intelligence. Intelligence production, assessment, and verification are all parts of
a professional tradecraft. Like any trade, these activities can be executed to
varying degrees of success by individuals with varying degrees of skill and
expertise. These professionals, therefore, may at times execute their tasks with
willful, wanton, or gross negligence. Intelligence agencies may or may not adopt
internal policies to prevent such behavior and to investigate and punish it once it
occurs. Whether due to group think and other cognitive biases11 or to more
fundamental and systemic intelligence failures, there may be preventable faults
in intelligence production and dissemination that an intelligence agency may
simply be unwilling or unable to control.12 The risk of failure is only
compounded when intelligence professionals turn to new surveillance
technologies, like drones or cyber espionage. In this double black box
scenario, as Ashley Deeks once called it, our already problematic operational
black box becomes subordinate to an equally hazardous algorithmic black

10. Orr Hirschauge & Hagar Shezaf, How Israel Jails Palestinians Because They Fit the
Terrorist Profile, HAARETZ (May 31, 2017), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.
MAGAZINE-israel-jails-palestinians-who-fit-terrorist-profile-1.5477437
(reporting
on
Israeli
intelligence officers building profiles of potential attackers based, in part, on information from social
media). For further reading, see Ashley Deeks, Predictive Enemies, 104 VA. L. REV. 1529, 1547-63 (2018)
(describing the current role that algorithms play in military decision-making in the areas of detention
review as well as targeting operations).
11. On the psychology of intelligence analysis, and in particular the common cognitive biases
shared by intelligence personnel, see RICHARD J. HEUER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
(1999).
12. See, e.g., McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, Judgment, ¶¶ 188-89, 213 (Sept.
27, 1995) (rejecting the governments position that all intelligence is necessarily based on incomplete
information and noting that the intelligence community should have given sufficient allowances to
counterfactuals that run against the collective groupthink); COMMN ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, Report to the President of the United States
2 (2005), govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/report/wmd_report.pdf (noting that the intelligence community
was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgements about Iraqs weapons of mass destruction and
explaining the errors, in part, by the communitys failure to make clear just how much of its analysis was
based on assumption.); THE PUBLIC COMMN TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME INCIDENT OF MAY 31 2010,
PART ONE, ¶¶ 243-48 (2011) (comparing the intelligence assessments conducted by British authorities in
McCann and those conducted by Israeli authorities in the Mavi Marmara case, the Commission noted that
while the intelligence failures of the British authorities led to a sense of increased risk, the Israeli
intelligence failures led to a state where the risk was underappreciated, which could explain why certain
soldiers might overreact when confronted with such unanticipated threats.).
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box,13 resulting in an increased likelihood of informational failures along the
technological chain.
This could be dangerous. Once produced, faulty information may be
disseminated to all parts of the military, including an air force pilot, an armor
crewman, a ground commander, or a chief of staff. Those military practitioners
will rely on that intelligence to calculate their strategic and operational decisionmaking in battle. This Article argues, then, that if international humanitarian law
(IHL) is truly interested in limiting the effects of armed conflict and mitigating
human suffering, then it must provide better regulation of the militarys
intelligence function, since those preliminary processes may determine the
outcomes of particular attacksand, in some cases, of a war as a whole.
The potential for cataclysmic consequences from faulty intelligence
assessments is perhaps most obvious in the context of wartime aerial strikes.
Modern history is filled with examples of wartime intelligence assessment errors
that led to calamitous air campaigns: from the battle of Monte Cassino in World
War II, to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and, more
recently, the U.S. attack on a Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz in
2015. In all of these examples, as in other case studies presented throughout the
Article, operations were launched on the basis of insufficient intelligence that
contained errors in the processing, analysis, and verification of information.
One might assume that these repeated failures would spark a debate on the
regulatory frameworks surrounding intelligence production in times of war. Yet
the opposite is true: the laws of war remain silent on this question, with national
security lawyers and human rights activists often apprehensive about delving
into the murky business of regulating espionage.14 In some ways, this is
surprising, since it is in the interest of the military commander, the belligerent
parties, and the international community as a whole to mitigate such risks by
developing prescriptive processes to regulate intelligence operations and avoid
suboptimal outcomes. Nonetheless, given that intelligence is still considered a
dirty word in international law,15 no one has previously set out to address the
practice. As a result, military commanders are provided only a general directive

13.
14.

Deeks, supra note 10, at 1537.
See Simon Chesterman, Intelligence Cooperation in International Operations, in
INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 124 (Hans Born et al. eds., 2011)
(Ever since the United Nations deployed peacekeepers into conflict zones it has been necessary to have
a deep understanding of the theatre of operations and parties to a conflict, yet intelligence was long
regarded as a dirty word as the 1984 Peacekeepers Handbook put it; military information was the
preferred euphemism . The prospect of the United Nations or any other international organisation
developing an independent intelligence collection capacity is remote At the same time, however, this
position reflects a larger anomaly in the status of intelligence under international law as an activity
commonly denounced but almost universally practised: empowering an international organisation to
engage in espionage might give the lie to this example of diplomatic doublethink.); see also Iñaki
Navarrete & Russel Buchan, Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage, International Law and
the Existence of Customary Exceptions, 51 CORNELL INTL L.J. 897, 932 (2019) (citing a statement made
by the Pakistani agent speaking before the ICJ in the Jadhav case that as far as the travaux préparatoires
are concerned, the drafters of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations made no reference to
espionage and thereby accepted the fiction that there were no spies. Navarrete and Buchan rely on this
bold remark to reinforce the idea that States have long regarded espionage as a dirty word.).
15. Chesterman, supra note 14; Navarrete & Buchan, supra note 14.
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to take all feasible precautions to minimize, if not avoid, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.16 But this
requirement, set out in Article 57(2) of the First Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions (hereinafter Article 57), is challenged by some states and
creates few, if any, concrete obligations on states to design and implement their
intelligence apparatus in particular ways.
This Article claims that faults in the production of intelligence for wartime
operations are not always inevitable, and that the lack of specific regulation
within the treatises of IHL causes such faults to occur at the rate that they do.
The principal pillars of IHLdistinction, necessity, proportionality, humanity,
and precautions in attackheavily depend on a forgotten supporting beam: an
adequate, sufficient, and reliable stream of intelligence information. The Article
thus takes an important first step towards defining the contours of a new duty of
care, the reasonable intelligence agency test. To develop this standard, the
Article considers historical case studies as well as emerging best practices. The
Article not only aims to establish the nature and scope of this new duty but also
to explore its possible codification within existing IHL, in hopes of creating civil
liability for states that fail to comply.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with a brief overview of
the law governing intelligence production in IHL and its existing limitations. The
first Part focuses on three primary questions: (1) where do we derive the right to
spy in times of war? (2) what are the laws that govern the conduct of such
intelligence operations? (3) what accountability mechanisms currently exist for
civilian harms resulting from intelligence errors?
Part II makes the general case for a new framework that would govern
liability for faulty intelligence production during war. This Part is composed of
three subsections. The first makes the case for a new standard by highlighting its
potential role in addressing the accountability gap for wartime errors, enhancing
the expressive function of IHL, and formalizing mechanisms of redress to
victims. The second subsection introduces the reasonable intelligence agency
standard and defines its underlying structure. The final subsection explains how
an informal rulemaking agenda could be utilized to further solidify, develop, and
expand the application of the new standard under existing IHL.
Part III applies this standard of care to three historical cases of aerial
campaigns in which intelligence failures caused significant losses of civilian life:
the Battle of Monte Casino (1944), the attack on the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade (1999); and the Gaza beach attack during Operation Protective Edge
(2014). For all three scenarios, to highlight the potential utility of a
reasonableness standard for intelligence production, the Article will demonstrate
how the duty of care could have altered the outcomes of each case. This Part
concludes by looking ahead to future wars, through a discussion of how the new
duty of care could help futureproof IHL in the face of developments in the area

16. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protections
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 57, adopted June 8, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7,
1979, 1125 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter API].
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of military artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making.
I.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION IN IHL: AN OVERVIEW

This Part provides a brief primer on the legal regime that governs
intelligence collection in times of war. Others have provided more
comprehensive histories of the development of this regime, and I do not want to
repeat too much of that here.17 My account will instead spend more time on the
limitations of the existing legal structure, which is the focus of this Article.
It is worth noting that there is no one agreed-upon definition of intelligence
as a matter of law, theory, or practice.18 In previous work, I proposed one
possible working definition of intelligence operations, which is based, in part,
on the idea that these operations involve the passive gathering, analysis,
verification, and dissemination of information.19 In my view, such a definition
encompass[es] all primary fields of intelligence gathering (or INTs as they are
known in traditional spy parlance),20 namely human, signals, visual, and opensource intelligence. Intelligence operations occur in both war and peace. What
determines whether certain information and information collection practices
should be regulatedat least concurrentlyby IHL depends on the purposes for
which the information is collected and whether it will be used for wartimerelated policymaking, and by whom.
Intelligence for wartime aerial targeting operations is a specific subset of
wartime intelligence. I focus on these operations as distinguishable from other
wartime attacks (like a surprise encounter with enemy combatants by a ground
squadron) not only because they tend to be more deadly for civilians,21 but also
and more importantly because these operations are often premeditated, thereby
creating significant temporal opportunities for IHL to regulate the process and,
ideally, to minimize or avoid errors. I discuss this point further in Section II.B.i
below. The targets of aerial attacks range in nature from a military base to a plant
manufacturing arms, and from the home of a known member of an armed group
to a broadcasting station spewing political propaganda and coded military
instructions.
Traditionally, wartime aerial targeting intelligence covers six unique
aspects and features:

17. See, e.g., JOHN KISH, War and Espionage, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 123
(David Turns ed., 1995) (describing the evolution of the international law regime surrounding intelligence
collection and spying in the laws of war).
18. Social theorist Michael Warner provides a relevant survey of different definitions that have
been proposed over the years, to no avail. See Michael Warner, Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence,
6 STUD. IN INTEL. 15 (2002).
19. See Asaf Lubin, Liberty to Spy, 61 HARV. INTL. L. J. 185, 192 (2020).
20. Id. at 193.
21. For example, according to the Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) campaign, which studied
data from the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, of the 3,977 total civilian casualties from airstrikes
in Afghanistan between 2016-2020, forty percent were children. For further reading see Murray Jones,
40% of All Civilian Casualties from Airstrikes in AfghanistanAlmost 1,600in the Last Five Years [sic]
Were Children, AOAV (May 6, 2021), https://aoav.org.uk/2021/40-of-all-civilian-casualties-fromairstrikes-in-afghanistan-almost-1600-in-the-last-five-years-were-children/.
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(1) GPS coordinates of the target and its physical location.22
(2) Aerial footage of the target and its surrounding.23
(3) The primary functions of the target.24
(4) The existence of sensitive sites surrounding the target.25
(5) The military advantage to be gained from attacking the target.26
(6) The expected incidental harm to civilians and civilian property.27
Much of the above detailed intelligence will be collected and collated long
before the operations are launched, often during peacetime.28 This information
will be stored in military archives in order to ensure operational readiness for a
22. Frans Osinga & Mark Roorda, From Douhet to Drones, Air Warfare, and the Evolution of
Targeting, in TARGETING: THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN WARFARE 27, 60 (Ducheine, Schmitt, & Osinga
eds., 2016) (discussing use of GPS information for U.S. aerial strikes against the Taliban).
23. See, e.g., LAURENT GISEL, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE RULES GOVERNING
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, ICRC (2016) [hereinafter
ICRC Expert Meeting Report] (involving the ICRC and twenty international experts discussing the
conduct of hostilities, and referencing additional assessments in the form of patterns of life analysis
that are traditionally recommended in order to determine the risk from any potential target ahead of
authorizing aerial targeting operations).
24. Information of this kind helps confirm with reasonable certainty that targeting these objects
will not violate the principle of distinction (for example, is the individual a direct participant in
hostilities and is the object a military object by its nature, location, purpose, or use, as those tests are
understood under IHL). See, e.g., OFF. GEN. COUNS., DEPT. DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL, ¶ 5.4.3
(June 2015, updated Dec. 2016) (noting that a commander must, on the basis of available information,
determine in good faith that a target is a military objective before authorizing an attack against that target)
[hereinafter DOD Manual].
25. See, e.g., Strobe Talbot, Letter of Submittal, Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, May 12, 1998, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 106-1, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-106tdoc1/html/CDOC-106tdoc1.htm (describing
the identification of cultural property sites in Iraq through intelligence resources during operation Desert
Storm). Other sensitive objects may include medical facilities, U.N. compounds, refugee camps, or
religious sites.
26. In May 2015, the Israeli government published a report summarizing its positions
concerning the events that unfolded in the summer of 2014 during Operation Protective Edge. The report
provides vital insight into the legal positions of Israel relating to aerial targeting under IHL, and in some
respects reflects the positions of other countries involved in similar aerial targeting operations during
active armed conflict. See ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT: FACTUAL
AND LEGAL ASPECTS ¶ 319 (May 2015), https://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Pages/default.aspx
[hereinafter Israel 2014 Gaza Conflict Report] (noting that intelligence for proportionality analyses may
include detailed information about the number and rank of militants anticipated to be hit during an attack,
as well as the quality and quantity of enemy weapons expected to be destroyed, and cannot take into
account unlikely possibilities of military advantage.). For further discussion of the law surrounding
assessments of military advantage see ICRC Expert Meeting Report, supra note 23, at 11-23.
27. Israel 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, supra note 26, ¶ 326 (noting that militaries are required
to exercise due diligence and devote reasonable efforts to collect information with respect to the collateral
damage expected but suggesting that no military has perfect information and that information
deficiencies are inevitable.). See also ICRC Expert Meeting Report, supra note 23, at 18 (showing that
the experts emphasized that, in armed conflicts, the degree of certainty of achieving the anticipated
military advantage is unlikely to be 100 per cent, due to insufficient information, potential enemy countermeasures or the fog of war.). I generally agree with these sentiments. However, it is precisely the
normative black boxes that are referred to here as due diligence, reasonable efforts, and information
deficits that I wish to explore further in this Article.
28. EWAN LAWSON & KUBO MAČÁK, INTL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, AVOIDING CIVILIAN
HARM FROM MILITARY CYBER OPERATIONS DURING ARMED CONFLICTS 46 n.121 (2020) [hereinafter
ICRC Avoiding Civilian Harm Report] (noting that the potential complexity of the intelligence
requirement also means that preparation may well take place prior to the outbreak of hostilities in what is
sometimes referred by some military planners as Phase 0).
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prospective war.29 To guarantee that the information remains accurate, it will be
routinely inspected, reviewed, and updated on the basis of new intelligence.30
Generally, though, as an armed conflict progresses, the preplanned targets will
begin to dwindle, and militaries will move to engage enemy forces discovered in
real time. At certain stages of the fighting in Afghanistan, for example, coalition
forces engaged pop-up targets by relaying time-sensitive up-to-date target
information to shooter platforms that were either inbound or already circling in
the vicinity.31 That information was collected in real time by unmanned aerial
vehicles, radar systems, and on-ground special forces.32 In the age of artificial
intelligence, such real-time intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination
is only likely to increase and be further automated.33
In identifying the normative framework surrounding wartime intelligence
production, it is important to distinguish between three separate legal questions:
(1) where do we derive the right to spy in times of war?
(2) what laws govern the conduct of intelligence collection, analysis and
promulgation? and
(3) what accountability mechanisms are currently in place to address faulty
intelligence?
These questions correspond to three temporal stages in the regulation of
intelligence operations: before launching the operation, during the operation, and
after the operation.34 In my prior work I have given names to each of these stages:

29. In Israeli military jargon, for example, these archives are often referred to as target banks,
as seen in Interview with Major S., Deputy Commander of the Israeli Air Force 200 Squadron (reprinted
in Ann Rogers, Investigating the Relationship Between Drone Warfare and Civilian Casualties in Gaza,
7 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 94, 101 (2014)) [hereinafter Interview with Major S.] (calling the archive a bank of
targets). Within the bank, each target receives a designated card. See Israel 2014 Gaza Conflict Report,
supra note 26, ¶ 246 (noting that the target planning process begins with the collection of intelligence
and describing how that intelligence is preserved in a Target Card. The card includes operational
directives and is subject to legal review that takes into account, among other things, precautions that could
be taken upon execution).
30. See Interview with Major S., supra note 29, at 103-104 (Every few months, it is essential
to check that the target is still relevant. If you find a weapons storage facility today, tomorrow they could
take all of the weapons out of the building and build a kindergarten. If I dont know about that change, I
might accidentally target it. Thats why we dont only find new targets; we also keep track of the existing
ones.).
31. See Osinga & Roorda, supra note 22, at 60.
32. Id.
33. AI military technologies are constantly evolving and improving, and may prove useful in an
array of different operational environments: The performance of these systems can make them very
useful for tasks such as identifying a T-90 main battle tank in a satellite image, identifying high-value
targets in a crowd using facial recognition, translating text for open-source intelligence, and text
generation for use in information operations . AI is also very capable in areas like recommendation
systems, anomaly detection, prediction systems, and competitive games. Paul Maxwell, Artificial
Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You Think), MOD. WAR INST. (Apr. 4, 2020),
https://mwi.usma.edu/artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-just-not-way-think/). See further discussion
infra Section III.C.
34. Roman Zakharov v. Russia, 2015-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 58, 58-59 (noting that surveillance
measures may be reviewed at three stages: when the surveillance is first ordered, while it is being carried
out, or after it has been terminated).
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jus ad explorationem, jus in exploratione, and jus post explorationem.35
A. The Right to Spy in War
The late Dr. John Kish denied the existence of a wartime prohibition on
espionage by referencing the inoperability of the doctrines of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, and non-intervention in times of war. Kish suggested that as
war prevails over sovereignty, the peacetime prohibition of espionage in
national spaces does not apply between belligerent States, and the permissibility
of espionage extends to all areas of hostilities, land, sea, and air, whether national
or international.36 This is quite intuitive. If war itself is legal, that is to say if a
state may lawfully launch armed attacks against another state under certain
constraints laid down in the U.N. Charter, then certainly non-armed forms of
interventionsuch as intelligence gathering that targets the same enemy state
and serves the same war effortsmust also be lawful.37
Wartime intelligence collection is plainly permissible under both
customary IHL and relevant treaty law. Article 101 to the Lieber Code of 1863
provided an early codification of the basic principle that deception in war is
admitted as a just and necessary means of hostility and is consistent with
honourable warfare.38 Article 13(e) of the Russian Draft Convention on the
Laws and Customs of War presented at the 1874 Brussels International
Conference followed a similar route, suggesting that: [A]mongst the means of
warfare which are permitted are the employment of every available means of
procuring information about the enemy and the country.39 These positions were
solidified in Article 24 of both the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Regulations, which
are also reflective of customary international law. The latter Convention reads:
Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining
information about the enemy and the country are considered permissible.40
35. Lubin, supra note 19, at 210.
36. KISH, supra note 17, at 123.
37. The customary principle of non-intervention forbids states from intervening directly or
indirectly in the internal affairs of other dtates. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2626 (XXV), Principle 3 (Oct. 24,
1970). In the case of Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice identified coercion that undermines
sovereign free choice as forming the very essence of unlawful intervention. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27).
Coercion is not limited to the use of force, but includes all other forms of interference or attempted
threats, thus precluding states from using economic, political, or any other type of measures to coerce
another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure
from it advantages of any kind. See G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965).
However, once at war, this framework ceases to apply. Countries at war revert to arms precisely because
they wish to undermine sovereign free choice and subordinate the exercise of another sovereigns rights,
within the authorized frameworks of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
38. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE FIELD, art. 101 (Apr. 24, 1863).
39. Russian Draft Convention on the Laws and Customs of War, art. 13(e) (July 27, 1874),
reprinted in 2 DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIŘÍ TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION
OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 29 (1988).
40. See Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 24, 36 Stat. 2295, (Oct. 18, 1907) [hereinafter
Hague Regulations 1907]; see also Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex
to Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 24, 32 Stat. 1803 (Jul. 29,
1899).
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These sources all confirm what was concluded by the great Richard Baxter as
early as 1951: [E]spionage is regarded a conventional weapon of war, being
neither treacherous nor productive of unnecessary suffering.41 In the specific
context of intelligence collection for aerial targeting, the justification was further
clarified in Jean Pictets commentary to the First Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions (API):
In the case of long-distance attacks, information will be obtained in particular from
aerial reconnaissance and from intelligence units, which will of course attempt to
gather information about enemy military objectives by various means.42

Foreign intelligence gathering was thus perceived by Pictet not only as a
lawful measure during war, but rather as a prerequisite for the proper functioning
of military units in compliance with their other IHL obligations. The only way
to comply with the rules of distinction, military necessity, and proportionality is
through an unrelenting wartime intelligence campaign.43
B. The Law Governing Intelligence Operations in Wartime
The fact that States possess a wartime liberty to spy, or perhaps even a duty
under certain circumstances, says nothing as to the way this liberty may be
discharged. Before we begin analyzing the law that applies to the conduct of
these wartime intelligence operations, it is important to briefly explain the
structure of a typical process of intelligence production. What is commonly
referred to as the intelligence cycle is better understood as the steps or stages
in intelligence, from policy makers perceiving a need for information to the
communitys delivery of an analytical intelligence product to them.44 Professor
Lowenthal maps out seven such steps common to most intelligence cycles: (1)
identification of requirements; (2) collection of intelligence information; (3)
processing and exploitation of said information;45 (4) collation, analysis, and

41. Richard R. Baxter, So-called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerillas, and Saboteurs,
28 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 323, 333 (1951). See also United States v. List (The Hostage Case), in 9 TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 759, 1245 (1950) (By the law of
war it is lawful to use spies.).
42. INTL COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 680-81 (1987).
43. This reality challenges doctrinal distinctions. As already discussed, a vast majority of
intelligence collection for aerial targeting purposes is done in peacetime, in preparation for war. This
brings to the forefront questions concerning the legality of peacetime espionage, an issue left unresolved
in the literature. Indeed, the U.N. Charter principles of territorial integrity and nonintervention, which are
abrogated during armed conflict, are very much in effect in times of peace. The extent to which we can
use a wartime privilege to justify potential violations of international law during peacetime, when war is
only looming, is highly contentious (for further discussion see Lubin, supra note 19, at 224-25). Moreover,
if we derive the legality of peacetime intelligence collection activities from their later wartime use, we
risk conflating jus ad bellum with jus in bello, two legal regimes which should operate independently of
one another (for a broader discussion on the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, see DOD
Manual, supra note 24, ¶ 3.5.1); cf. ICRC Avoiding Civilian Harm Report, supra note 28, at 46 n.121
(suggesting that the development of certain cyber tools in peacetime to be later used during war already
requires consideration of all relevant IHL requirements for such subsequent use to be lawful).
44. MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 70 (6th ed. 2014).
45. The process of decoding and reorganizing the information is to make it accessible to the
analysts. The most common and simple example for action at this stage is translating documents from
their original language to the spoken language of the agency.
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production of intelligence products; (5) dissemination of products; (6)
consumption of products by policy makers; and (7) feedback, which leads to
identification of new requirements, and the wheel goes round.46 To these seven
stages, I would add a continuous eighth stage: (8) verification of authenticity and
accuracy. Throughout the entire cycle, and parallel to the other tasks of
collection, processing, analysis, consumption, and feedback, materials must be
routinely scrutinized. The credibility of the information must be closely
examined and consistently challenged.
i.

Rules Governing Wartime Intelligence Collection

Certain aspects of intelligence collection are already governed by existing
IHL frameworks. Consider a few relevant IHL rules as examples. Article 24 of
the Hague Regulations establishes that in times of war, the employment of
measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country
are considered permissible.47 As the commentary provides, this provision
should not be taken to mean that every ruse of war and every method necessary
to obtain information about the enemy and the country should ipso facto be
considered permissible.48 Indeed, in obtaining information, a belligerent must
not contravene specific rules of war.49 For instance, as the U.S. Department of
Defenses law-of-war manual highlights, torture of detainees or the abusive use
of a flag or truce to obtain information would be considered illegal.50
In both the treatises and customary law of IHL, one can find a long list of
prohibitive and affirmative rules covering an ambit of possible intelligence
collection techniques. Aside from the examples already cited by the Department
of Defenses manual, one can, inter alia, find answers in IHL to additional
questions, such as: does collecting visible intelligence (VISINT) from a balloon
or other military reconnaissance aircrafts constitute a legitimate act of war?51
May a neutral vessel collect intelligence on the activities of a belligerent and
transmit this information to another belligerent, and may a belligerent conduct
espionage from neutral ports and waters?52 May propaganda be used to support
intelligence gathering?53 May prisoners of war, protected persons, and the
civilian population in the occupied territory be subjected to pressure in order to
obtain certain intelligence information?54 May belligerents continue to gather
intelligence during an armistice, and may they rely on that intelligence after the
armistice had ended?55 The list goes on.
46.
47.
48.

LOWENTHAL, supra note 44, at 70.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
THE HAGUE, REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMISSION, COMMENTARY TO DRAFT ARTICLE 24,
INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE (July 5, 1899), reprinted in JAMES B. SCOTT, REPORTS TO THE
HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 146 (1917).
49. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 325 (1959).
50. See DOD Manual, supra note 24, ¶ 5.26.2.
51. See Hague Regulations 1907, supra note 40, art. 29.
52. See KISH, supra note 17, at 128-33.
53. See DOD Manual, supra note 24, ¶ 5.26.1.
54. See KISH, supra note 17, at 137-44.
55. See DOD Manual, supra note 24, ¶ 12.11.4.4.
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What is important to note, however, is that all of these rules relate only to
the second stage in the intelligence cycle. While there exists ample regulation as
to the way intelligence is to be collected during war, the other stages of the
intelligence cycle, namely intelligence processing and exploitation, analysis, and
verification (3, 4, and 8, respectively) remain unregulated. This is problematic,
as it is in these stages where the bleeding gets done in IHL, quite literally.
ii. Rules Governing Wartime Intelligence Processing, Analysis,
and Verification
There is only one rule in the treatises from which one can derive some
general guideline on how intelligence is to be processed, analyzed, and verified
in times of war. The rule is enumerated under Article 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii) to API, and
is known as the precautions principle:
[T]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i) do everything feasible to verify
that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not
subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this
Protocol to attack them; (ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.56

We should ask three questions about this rule: (1) is it binding international
law? (2) what is the scope of the obligation? and (3) to whom does this obligation
extend?
With regards to its customary nature, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (CIHL)
confirms in rule 15 that the precautions principle is a norm of customary
international law applicable in both international and non-international armed
conflicts.57 Notably, even the United States, a nonparty to API and one of its
most vocal opponents, has never challenged the binding nature of the principle.58
Indeed, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
noted in Prosecutor v. Kuprekić, Article 57 reflects custom not only because it
specifies general pre-existing norms but also because it does not appear to be

56. API, supra note 16, art. 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). The duties exist with regards to
attacks on land, at sea, and in the air.
57. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK FOR THE INTL COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 51 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Customary
Rules].
58. See, e.g., Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. J. INTL. L.
& POLY 419, 427 (1987) (explaining that the deputy legal adviser at the U.S. Department of State accepts
the precautions principle as binding on the United States); THEODORE RICHARD, UNOFFICIAL UNITED
STATES GUIDE TO THE FIRST ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949, 117-29 (2019) (providing an array of citations all confirming that the United States views the
precautions principle as customary international law); cf. Adil Ahmad Haque, Off Target: Selection,
Precaution, and Proportionality in the DOD Manual, 92 INTL L. STUD. 31, 53 (2016) (suggesting that
the U.S. interpretation of the precautions in attack principle is dangerously unbalanced and divorced
from the law. In particular, the DoDs position gives military considerations absolute priority over
humanitarian considerations in determining an attackers pre-cautionary obligations).
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contested by any State, including those which have not ratified the Protocol.59
The commentary to Article 57 states that the provision required lengthy
discussions and difficult negotiations and that the resulting text was the fruit
of laborious compromise.60 It is therefore not surprising that Article 57
ultimately only prescribes generic precautions and is not prescriptive as to
exactly how they should be accomplished.61 This was to the dismay of some
states, which considered the provision deficient in clarity and vague in
wording.62 The ICRC representative to the Diplomatic Conference, Mr.
Mirimanoff-Chilkine, saw this flexible terminology as a strength, not a
shortcoming. His belief was that belligerents would progressively produce more
precise guidance for how these rules are to be applied in real time.63 Mr.
Mirimanoff-Chilkine never got his wish, though. As one commentator notes,
contemporary military manuals and rules of engagement do little to provide
guidance, let alone list criteria for commanders as to how to apply Article 57.64
As far as the scope of the obligation goes, there is a lot of ambiguity
surrounding the rule. The phrases do everything feasible to verify or take all
feasible precautions require significant elucidation as a matter of legal standard.
The Expert Committee established by the prosecutor of the ICTY to review the
1999 NATO bombing campaign attempted to answer this question:
The obligation to do everything feasible is high but not absolute. A military
commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and
evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander must also direct
his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets during
operations. Both the commander and the aircrew actually engaged in operations must
have some range of discretion to determine which available resources shall be used
and how they shall be used.65

While the Committees attempt to clarify the obligations of the contracting
parties is certainly worthy of praise, it is problematic nonetheless. The
Committee merely replaces one ambiguous phrase (do everything feasible) with
two others (effective intelligence gathering system, properly identify). Lacking
specific criteria, states are left with a general zone of reasonableness66 within
59. Prosecutor v. Kuprekić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524 (Intl Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
60. INTL COMM. RED CROSS, supra note 42, at 678.
61. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 123 (2012).
62. 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 231 (197477) (providing statement by Italy at the 42nd Plenary Meeting on the Adoption of the Articles of Draft
Protocol I).
63. 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 182 (197477) (statement by the ICRC at the 21st meeting on the consideration of Draft Protocols I and II). Article
50 became Article 57 during drafting.
64. TETYANA KRUPIY, A TOOLBOX FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF TARGETING 129
(2016).
65. FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE
NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ¶ 29 (June 2, 2000),
https://www.icty.org/sid/10052 [hereinafter ICTY Expert Committee Report] (emphasis added).
66. AMICHAI COHEN & DAVID ZLOTOGORSKI, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: CONSEQUENCES, PRECAUTIONS, AND PROCEDURES 199 (2021).
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which they are asked to employ reasonably available resources and to gather
reasonably available information.67 Those states are merely asked to exercise
basic due diligence, meaning to do what is practicably possible, taking into
account all circumstances ruling at the time.68 In case of doubt, even if there is
only slight doubt, commanders must call for additional information and if need
be give orders for further reconnaissance.69 The bar is thus set quite low. As
noted by Peter Margulies:
A feasible step is one that is practicable, given resource constraints, technological
limits, and tactical concerns, such as the importance of preserving certain means or
instrumentalities of warfare (including weapons) for future engagements, and the
disadvantage of disclosing certain advancements to adversaries or the world at large.
A feasible step is not one that is merely possible; requiring a State to implement all
possible steps would unduly burden commanders, undermining the crucial value of
military necessity.70

There will obviously be cases that are clearly outside the zone of
reasonableness. The Central Front award of the Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims
Commission offers one clear illustration. In that case, the arbitrators concluded
that a bombardment by utterly inexperienced pilots and ground crew, which
further lacked adequate preparation indicates a lack of essential care . . .
compounded by Eritreas failure to take appropriate actions afterwards to prevent
future recurrence.71
Although the Central Front award represents an obvious extreme,
situations involving faulty intelligence are typically less clear-cut and therefore
require more tailored criteria. As Hampson asks, for example: How strenuous
must the efforts be to obtain intelligence? How regularly must it be updated?72
These kinds of intelligence-specific questions have never been specifically
addressed under the existing treatises of IHL, hence the focus of this Article.
Finally, we might wish to explore who is bound by the rule. Article 57
places the obligation to implement precautions with those who plan or decide
upon an attack. But who are these planners and deciders? Some scholars
have suggested that the obligation extends to all military personnel effectively
having the power to influence the decisions or the execution of an attack.73 But
67. KRUPIY, supra note 64, at 126.
68. ICRC Customary Rules, supra note 57 (discussing Practice Relating to Rule 15).
69. 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 63, at 182.
70. Peter Margulies, Autonomous Cyber Capabilities Below and Above the Use of Force
Threshold: Balancing Proportionality and the Need for Speed, 96 INTL L. STUD. 394, 425 (2020)
(footnotes omitted). The DOD Manual, supra note 24, ¶ 5.2.3.2 includes other factors to consider: the
effect of taking the precaution on the mission accomplishment; whether taking the precaution poses a risk
to ones own forces or presents other security risks; the likelihood and degree of humanitarian benefit
from taking the precaution; the cost of taking the precaution in terms of time, money, or other resources;
or whether taking the precaution forecloses alternative courses of action.
71. Central Front (Partial Award) (Ethiopias Claim 2), XXVI Eritrea-Ethiopia Cl. Trib. Reps.
155, ¶ 110 at 189-90 (Apr. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Central Front Award].
72. Françoise J. Hampson, Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf, in THE
GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 89, 93 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993).
73. ROBERT KOLB, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 167
(2014); see also A. P. V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 153 (3rd ed., 2012) (noting that the
requirement applies to everybody involved in military operations from the ministry of defense planning
staffs, through the commander in the field to the tank commander).
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such an expansive interpretation seems disconnected from the positions of
certain states. Switzerland, for example, upon ratifying API, made a reservation
which clarified that the obligation under Article 57 is binding only on battalion
or group commanders and higher echelons.74 The Austrian delegate to APIs
negotiations similarly stressed that the precautions envisaged could only be
taken at a higher level of military command.75
The logic behind these states proposition is that responsibility should vary
according to an actors access to information. Junior ranked officials are at an
informational disadvantage compared to their more senior counterparts, and
therefore are less likely to be able to discharge the duties set out by Article 57.76
In any event, even the most expansive reading of the precautions in attack
principle would not seem to cover intelligence, collected months in advance by
a civilian agency, which at the time may or may not have been intended for use
in a targeting decision. In other words, significant portions of the intelligence
production cycle seem legally outside the scope of Article 57s reach. This is
because intelligence professionals are usually temporally, physically, and
functionally removed from the planning and execution stages of attacks.
As a result, the core of the responsibility falls on the shoulders of the
military commander. Recall the quote from the ICTY Committee report: since it
is the military commander who is required to set up an effective intelligence
gathering system, she must be the one to give directions to use available
technical means to properly identify targets, and she exercises the discretion
to determine which available resources shall be used.77 Accordingly, then,
tribunals and military manuals guide us to rely on the reasonable commander
test in determining the lawfulness of a particular strike.78
Yet by focusing its analysis on the military commander, those tribunals and
military manuals neglect the fact that any reasonable commander will turn to a
reasonable intelligence analyst whose conduct is governed by notably underdefined IHL standards. The problem is that modern military commanders often
do not know what an effective intelligence gathering system looks like, or how
to properly process, analyze, and verify intelligence materials as a matter of
professional practice. Nor do they have access to the raw intelligence or the
decisions surrounding it, much of which has been processed and digested long

74. Julie Gaudreau, The Reservations to the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions
for the Protection of War Victims, 849 INTL REV. RED CROSS 143, 162 (2003), https://www.icrc.org/
en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc_849_gaudreau-eng.pdf.
75. 3 PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 123 (Howard
Levie ed., 1980).
76. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 140 (2d ed., 2010) (noting that only high echelons have the prerequisite overview
of the military situation.); see also BOOTHBY, supra note 61, at 120.
77. See ICTY Expert Committee Report, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
78. See 2 ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: PRACTICE  PART 1, AT
331-35 (2005); Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, Trial
Chamber I, ¶ 58 (Intl Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (In determining whether an
attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her,
could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.).
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before it arrives at the commanders desk.79
To illustrate the problem, consider the Obama-era Presidential Policy
Guidance (PPG) on drone warfare. In 2013, the Obama administration
introduced a policy whereby aerial strikes could only be authorized when there
is near certainty that the individual being targeted is in fact the lawful target and
located at the place where the action will occur.80 Also, the policy established
that such strikes may be launched only if there is near certainty that the action
can be taken without injuring or killing non-combatants.81
On its face, Obamas PPG seems quite promising, especially from the
perspective of humanitarian protection. Once the guidance leaves the desk of the
President, however, it must be operationalized by dozens of military,
intelligence, and legal professionals. This is where the policy enters the great
charcuterie of the intelligence community. The professionals take the words of
the presidentthe recipe, if you willand begin cooking. The dish they serve
might look quite different from what was originally envisaged, as the general
guidance is churned and minced within the intelligence communitys many meat
grinders. Determinations of near certainty ultimately depend, then, on
intelligence policies and assessment guidelines that are beyond the commanderin-chiefs realm of expertise.82
The results can be devastating. Recall the story of Warren Weinstein and
Giovanni Lo Porto, the American and Italian al-Qaeda hostages who were killed
in an American drone strike in January 2015. The attack was the result of a gross
intelligence omission. After hundreds of hours of surveillance, the United
States authorized an operation targeting an al-Qaeda compound without any idea
that the hostages were being held there, and then proceeded to take months to
realize or acknowledge its mistake.83 Expecting a commander-in-chief like
President Obama to set out and understand the internal procedures that could
prevent such tragedies from taking place seems unreasonable, given that it would
require him to possess expertise about the way intelligence gets made that is
outside his professional purview. An alternative approach is for IHL to directly
provide intelligence agencies with clearer rules and guidelines as to how their
assessments should be developed so as to comply with the general obligation
under article 57 of API. Such a framework will fill the regulatory gap by
generating a set of enforceable norms for intelligence production.

79. See ROGERS, supra note 73, at 150; STUART CASEY-MASLEN & STEVEN HAINES, HAGUE
LAW INTERPRETED: THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 200 (2018).
80. Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the
United States and Areas of Active Hostilities 1 (May 22, 2013) (emphasis added), http://
www.nuhanovicfoundation.org/user/file/2016_presidential_policy_guidance.pdf.
This
Presidential
Policy Guidance (PPG) was released in a redacted version in August 2016 under court order.
81. Id.
82. The Presidential Policy Guidance itself called on operating agencies to establish
harmonized policies and procedures for assessing: (1) near certainty that a lawful target is present; (2)
near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed. In other words, the guidance specifically
asks the chefs to figure out how to make the sausage. Id. at 4.
83. See Peter Baker, Obama Apologizes After Drone Kills American and Italian Held by AlQaeda, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/2-qaeda-hostageswere-accidentally-killed-in-us-raid-white-house-says.html?_r=0.
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To be clear, my goal in this Article is not to debate whether the military
commander or the intelligence officers should be held individually liable. Rather,
I am interested in holding states to account for their unreasonably faulty
intelligence. Therefore, my goal in this piece is to propose a set of specialized
standards of behavior for the intelligence community that could be used to make
determinations of state civil liability. This naturally raises one additional
question: what accountability frameworks currently govern a targeting decision
by a state that relies on unreasonably faulty intelligence and that causes
significant loss of life or injury to civilian objects?
C. State Responsibility for Wartime Faulty Intelligence
States are not currently held liable under any existing legal framework for
causing unintended civilian harms during war. As a matter of criminal law, the
International Law Commission (ILC) explicitly rejected the concept of
international crimes for states when it finalized the Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).84 As a matter of civil
law, states are required to make full reparations for injurious actions or
omissions that are both attributable to them and that are a breach of an
international obligation owed by them.85 Article 91 of API further confirms that
a party to a conflict that violates the provisions of the Protocol shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation.86 In the absence of a legal violation,
however, victims are not entitled to seek reparations, and no entity will be held
legally responsible. As a result, the decision to make or withhold reparations to
individual victims is undoubtedly a matter of self-interest of the relevant country
in the relevant theater of war.87
As discussed previously, Article 57 of API establishes an amorphous legal
standard and, as a result, sets a problematically low bar for compliance with
IHL.88 If international law only ever prohibits wanton disregard for possible
civilian casualties,89 then conduct that falls below this high threshold will be
treated as an unfortunate but otherwise lawful cost of war. In this regard, the U.S.
Law of War Manual makes clear that mere poor military judgement (such as
mistakes or accidents in conducting attacks that result in civilian casualties) is

84. For further reading see James Crawford, International Crimes of States, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 405-15 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
85. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Annex to G.A. Res. 56/83, art.
31(1) (Jan. 28, 2002).
86. API, supra note 16, art. 91. The rule that a state that is responsible for violations of
international humanitarian law is required to make full reparation for the loss or injury is a norm of
customary international law recognized in both international and non-international armed conflicts. See
ICRC Customary Rules, supra note 57, Rule 150.
87. Gabriella Blum, The Individualization of War: From War to Policing in the Regulation of
Armed Conflicts, in LAW AND WAR 49, 71 (Austin Sarat et al., eds., 2014).
88. For a broader discussion, see Rebecca Crootof, War Torts 27 (work in progress on file with
author).
89. Off. of the Legal Advisor, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
2064 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart, eds., 1991) (including U.S. comments on the ICRCs
memorandum on the applicability of international humanitarian law).
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not by itself a violation of the obligation to take precautions in attacks.90
Consider the United States bombing of a mosque complex near al-Jinah,
Syria on March 16, 2017. While the attack was intended to target a site where a
meeting between al-Qaeda and Syrian militants was taking place, the U.S.
aircraft ended up bombing the Omar Ibn al-Khatab mosque, killing 38 people.91
It was later revealed that some of the intelligence team did know this was a
religious complex, but the analysis did not get to the no-strike list nor to the target
engagement authority.92 The failure to engage in a more deliberate pre-strike
analysis resulted in what one general described as a preventable error.93
Under Article 57s ambiguous standard, an incident like the U.S. attack in
al-Jinah probably does not merit civil liability. U.S. Central Command
investigated the incident and concluded that procedural errors in the targeting
process reduced the thoroughness the U.S. typically achieves through its
targeting methodology but that, despite these shortcomings, the strike was
nonetheless lawful.94 That is because negligence in intelligence production is not
prohibited under the laws of war, and civilian casualties that result from it are
not treated as internationally wrongful. They are seen as an unfortunate
byproduct of war, one that does not necessitate mandatory reparations.
Counterinterpretations by Human Rights Watch,95 a Commission of Inquiry of
the U.N. Human Rights Council,96 and other legal scholars97 notwithstanding,
what this incident demonstrates is that clearer legal standards for intelligence
production are a necessary first step towards stronger civil liability and
enforcement. This notion will be the heart of Part II.
II. RECONFIGURING INTELLIGENCE IN WAR
This Article contends that Article 57s dependence on the internal
supervisory mechanisms of the military commander make contemporary IHL
unlikely to achieve optimal deterrence and mitigation of risk. After all, to
paraphrase Geoffrey Corn, Article 57s obligation to gather and review all
reasonably available information is only as effective as the process established
to ensure the obligation is implemented.98 As outlined above, the intelligence
90. See DOD Manual, supra note 24, ¶ 5.2.3.3.
91. The Pentagons Al Jinah Investigation Media Briefing, AIRWARS (June 27, 2017),
https://airwars.org/news-and-investigations/transcript-of-al-jinah-investigation-briefing/
(including
transcript).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Shane Reeves & Ward Narramore, The UNHRC Commission of Inquiry on Syria Misapplies
the Law of Armed Conflict, LAWFARE (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/unhrc-commissioninquiry-syria-misapplies-law-armed-conflict.
95. Attack on the Omar Ibn al-Khatab Mosque, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/18/attack-omar-ibn-al-khatab-mosque/us-authorities-failure-takeadequate-precautions#.
96. Rep. of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
at 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/55 (Aug. 8, 2017).
97. Adil Ahmad Haque, A Careless Attack on the U.N.s Commission of Inquiry on Syria, JUST
SEC. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/45213/syria-commission-inquiry/.
98. Geoffrey S. Corn, War, Law, and the Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary
Measure, 42 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 419, 456 (2015).
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process that is at the heart of many targeting decisions is one that military
commanders possess only limited capacity to manage and effectively control. In
a sense, then, intelligence professionals form a guild, an association of
craftspeople with their own tools, language, and skills.
Indeed, the coding and encoding of threat and target assessments is an art
form, and like any art form, it follows an internal codebook: a set of practices,
procedures, and acronyms known only to members of the trade. Like any other
profession, its members owe a duty of care to the societies they serve and, for
intelligence professionals specifically, to the targets they surveil, and arguably
to the international community writ large. Developing this duty of carewhich
I call a reasonable intelligence agency testis but one of the many tools at the
disposal of the diligent regulator to manage the otherwise hazardous activity of
these specialized professionals. With the goal of ensuring the adoption of all
available socially beneficial preventative measures, the new duty of care will be
based on considerations of efficiency, deterrence, and social justice.
By attempting to expand existing liability frameworks, this Part is in direct
conversation with other scholars who have proposed reforming IHL regimes to
assign greater tortious liability to states.99 The following pages complement the
existing literature by proposing a specific duty of care for intelligence agencies
as an important piece of broader changes to IHLs accountability structures. This
Part argues that Article 57 of API should be reinterpreted twice over. First, it
should be extended to reach the intelligence elements of the state.100 Second, its
content should be clarified so as to include intelligence-tailored standards,
especially around internal processing and assessment structures and information
sharing frameworks.
If Article 57 and its affiliated doctrines of distinction and proportionality
are read as requiring a certain set of expected behaviors from intelligence
agencies, then a failure to meet those standards would constitute a violation of
IHL. Such a violation could, in turn, trigger state liability under ARSIWA. This
Part proceeds in the following order. First, I discuss the potential value of
recognizing a new duty of care. Second, I describe the scope and nature of this
new duty. Finally, I propose how this duty could be read into existing IHL
frameworks and embedded in informal IHL lawmaking.

99. See, e.g., Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Violations of the Ius in Bello:
An Imperfect Balance, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES (2007);
Haim Abraham, Tort Liability for Belligerent Wrongs, 39 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 808 (2019); Rebecca
Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347 (2016);
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Reparation for Violation of International Humanitarian Law, 85 ICRC REV.
529 (2003); Yael Ronen, Avoid or Compensate? Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflicted
During Armed Conflict, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 181 (2009); Andrew Childers & Anna Lamut, Legal
Foundations for Making Amends to Civilians Harmed by Armed Conflict, HARV. INTL HUM. RTS.
CLINIC,
2-3
(2012),
http://www.nuhanovicfoundation.org/user/file/2012_childers_and_lamut_
on_legal_foundations_for_making_amends_to_civilians_harmed_by_armed_conflict.pdf.
100. This proposal echoes one that was made by Geoffrey Corn, who suggested that Article 57s
implementation requires emphasizing an obligation to constantly assess risk to civilians and civilian
property at every level of command including the intelligence element. See Corn, supra note 98, at
457.
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A. Making the Case for a New Duty of Care for Intelligence
A new duty of care for intelligence agencies will achieve three main goals.
First, it will address the existing accountability gap for wartime errors by
determining reasonable and unreasonable intelligence faults. Second, it will
enhance international laws expressive value and resolve hierarchical
governance challenges. Finally, it will set the groundwork for the creation of
formal mechanisms of redress that will substitute existing voluntary and
unsystematized ex gratia (i.e., by favor and not by law) payment models.
i.

Addressing the Accountability Vacuum for Wartime Errors

In her most recent work, Mary Manjikian identifies multiple occasions
where U.S. presidentsincluding Reagan, Clinton, and Bushall claimed that
they were blindsided by operations of the intelligence community.101 These
presidents claimed to be unaware of the exact nature of the intelligence
activities conducted under their watch, and asserted that if they had been better
informed, they would have taken steps to see that [situations of intelligence
overreach and failure] did not occur.102 In so doing, each leader sought to excuse
himself from blame, laying it instead on the doorstep of the intelligence
community.103
Herein lies the danger. If citing faulty intelligence is enough to deem a
wartime incident a mere accident that triggers a blanket safe harbor from
liability, then political leaders and military commanders would have undue
discretion to defeat the object and purpose of IHL, which aims to limit the effects
of war on certain categories of people and property.
Introducing a duty of care is thus necessary to enhance the enforcement
capacity of IHL by preventing the ability of states from continuously claiming
intelligence errors as a sort of get-out-of-jail-free card. The intent here is to
help clarify the distinction between what Marko Milanovic has called honest
but unreasonable mistakes in war and those which are honest and
reasonable.104 It is important to clarify that not all intelligence blunders are
reasonable by default and to determine when the behavior of the intelligence
community might be so egregious as to establish state responsibility for a
violation of IHL.105 In that way, creating a new duty of care for intelligence
101. MARY MANJIKIAN, GENDER SEXUALITY AND INTELLIGENCE STUDIES: THE SPY IN THE
CLOSET 252 (2020).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Marko Milanovic, Mistakes of Fact When Using Lethal Force in International Law: Part I,
EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/mistakes-of-fact-when-using-lethal-force-ininternational-law-part-i/.
105. Note that Milanovic writes such a violation is a plain, vanilla violation of IHL, not to be
confused with a war crime triggering individual criminal liability. Indeed, Article 30 of the Rome Statute
establishes individual criminal liability only where a person acts with intent and knowledge. See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 30, adopted July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. International criminal law in its current form therefore does not capture negligent acts.
For further reading see, for example, HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, UNLAWFUL ATTACKS IN COMBAT SITUATIONS
219-23 (2008); Brian L. Cox, Recklessness, Intent, and War Crimes: Refining the Legal Standard and
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agencies would further help to achieve what states hoped would happen
organically to Article 57: that over time, interpretations of the provision in
practice would provide more detailed direction and clearer guidance.106 By
developing a standard for intelligence collection, processing, verification, and
dissemination, and then applying it to ongoing cases in scholarly, judicial, and
pseudo-judicial legal reviews, a new common law of Article 57 could finally
emerge.
ii. Enhancing International Laws Expressive Value and
Resolving Governance Challenges
This Article adopts the view that the law plays an important expressive and
projective function. Regardless of actual enforcement, articulating rules that
directly bind the operations of the intelligence community would mark a
significant shift. As Dan Kahan has written, [p]unishment is not just a way to
make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that signifies moral
condemnation.107 Similarly, Richard Pildes and Cass Sunstein argue that policy
choices reflect value commitments, and that the expressive consequences of
laying out societal policy preferences and prioritizations are just as important as
the material consequences.108
For example, at the most immediate level, developing a new duty of care
for intelligence agencies would mean that civilian and military intelligence
officers would be trainedfor the first time in most countrieson the rules of
the Geneva Conventions, including Article 57. The importance of such training
should not be understated. Military education is the fundamental foundation
upon which the soldier forms his judgment as to what is and is not permissible
conduct during combat.109 Some researchers in psychology and neuroscience
have suggested that military-ethics training can help shape non-conscious
moral perception and moral deliberation of the trainees and emphasize the
importance of avoiding civilian deaths.110 In other words, through the crucible
of realistic training, intelligence officers can develop a genuine understanding
of the relationship between the law and the execution of their mission.111
Even more fundamentally, perhaps, the expressive function of the law
could play a long-term role in readjusting our normative structures in the face of
collective action problems. As Sunstein describes, the introduction of new rules
into a society can serve a norm entrepreneurship function, as those rules help
Clarifying the Role of International Criminal Tribunals as a Source of Customary International Law, 52
GEO. J. INTL L. 1, 15 (2020); Alex Whiting, Recklessness, War Crimes, and the Kunduz Hospital
Bombing, JUST SEC. (May 2, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/30871/recklessness-war-crimeskunduz-hospital-bombing/.
106. KRUPIY, supra note 64, at 129.
107. Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 599 (1996).
108. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 66 (1995).
109. See Corn, supra note 98, at 445-46.
110. Kevin Mullaney & Milton Regan, One Minute in Haditha: Ethics and Non-Conscious
Decision-Making, 18 J. MIL. ETHICS 75, 89-93 (2019).
111. See Corn, supra note 98, at 446-47.
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redesign societal expectations by shift[ing] the bases of shame and pride.112
By expanding the reach of Article 57 to explicitly cover intelligence work, we
could reshape behavioral norms with a bent towards moral and ethical decision
making. Additionally, the codification of intelligence regulation in IHL could
help externalize monitoring functions from the state to third parties like the ICRC
or other international organizations.113 Such externalization could introduce a
new mechanism for controlling intelligence by managing the delicate interface
within the echelons of military power.114
While we might intuitively think that states have a vested interest in
maintaining quality assurance around their intelligence products, the examples
that have been discussed so far already demonstrate a principal-agent failure.
Whether due to ignorance, excessive zeal, or unconscious bias, intelligence
professionals at times act negligently. For U.S. airstrikes, on average at least
one incident of civilian harm has happened every week since 9/11.115 As Larry
Lewis notes, [t]his level of civilian harm is not a necessity of war, and certainly
can be mitigated.116 It reflects an overall pattern of negligence117 that
permeates the work of every agency along the kill chain. If we accept the
contention that IHL is a story of principals seeking ways to enhance their
domination over their military agents,118 then expanding Article 57s reach to
the intelligence community could resolve one type of the militarys principalagent problem. Under this framework, military commanders would be given a
new governance tool to better manage and control their intelligence providers
and resources.119
Finally, a new standard for reasonable wartime intelligence assessments
could become a force multiplier for ongoing debates about the place of
intelligence in society.120 It could result in a permanent forum for previously
unimaginable multi-stakeholder discussions between intelligence and national
security professionals on the one hand, and human rights advocates and
humanitarians on the other. Such conversations could result in what Sunstein
calls norm bandwagons, whereby new institutions create lowered costs for

112. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 203031 (1996).
113. Eyal Benvenisti & Amichai Cohen, War is Governance: Explaining the Logic of the Laws
of War from a Principal-Agent Perspective, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1371-72 (2014).
114. Id. at 1369.
115. Larry Lewis, Hidden Negligence: Aug. 29 Drone Strike is Just the Tip of the Iceberg, JUST
SEC. (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/78937/hidden-negligence-aug-29-drone-strike-is-justthe-tip-of-the-iceberg/.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Benvenisti & Cohen, supra note 113, at 1385.
119. This is of a special importance given that intelligence agencies are not as familiar with the
requirements of IHL as military forces are, and where there is an incentive to deliberately shift
operations between agencies with a view to avoiding these obligations. See ICRC Avoiding Civilian
Harm Report, supra note 28, at 14.
120. For more on these ongoing debates, see Asaf Lubin, Solar Winds as a Constitutive Moment:
A New Agenda for the International Law of Intelligence, JUST SEC. (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/73989/solarwinds-as-a-constitutive-moment-a-new-agenda-for-theinternational-law-of-intelligence/.
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expressing norms and thereby a higher possibility that regulatory shifts will
occur as more people join the new policy bandwagon.121
iii. Formalizing Mechanisms of Redress
Developing a standard for assessing the reasonableness of a particular
intelligence operation will offer the first step towards articulating a more
adequate mechanism for assessing when and under what circumstances a state
could be held internationally liable for compensating victims of harm. Currently,
only some states make condolence payments, and even for those states, payments
are sporadic and discretionary. These condolence ex gratia payments do not
reflect legal responsibility or create precedent that could make remedies
obligatory in the future. As such, ex gratia payments do not address or supplant
formal accountability for any unlawful harm.122
It is crucial, then, to create a standard of care that will generate civil liability
to the victims of state harms in armed conflict not as a moral or symbolic gesture,
but rather as a reflection of legal obligation. It will finally operationalize what
Michael Reisman argued for over two decades ago:
Whether or not its actions were internationally criminal or were marked by a chain
of grievous errors, innocent victims are entitled to the repair of their injuries. That
repair should not come from the international community, but from the party that,
arguably in ways compatible with the law of war, elected to reduce its own exposure
and contain its own injuries by shifting the danger and consequent injury onto others.
In imposing the costs of the engagement onto innocent parties, a belligerent should,
like anyone in war or peace, be obliged to repair the injuries it has caused in a
measure proportional to its contribution to them.123

A standard that holds the state to account for abuses committed by its
intelligence community could also play an important role in enhancing a sense
of justice with victim groups. In this scenario, the targets of covert intelligence
operations would no longer be left to fend for themselves, but rather would be
empowered to speak out against those who worked in the shadows to surveil
them. Victims would be encouraged to tell their stories and be appropriately
compensated for the abuse they suffered. Such a reality could be not only
restorative but transformative.
B. The Reasonable Intelligence Agency Standard
When creating a new legal standard for intelligence gathering, it is
important for utilitarian reasons to assess the likely impacts of any proposed
change. Helpfully, existing doctrines of tort law already provide a multi-pronged

121. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909, 912 (1996).
122. Annie Shiel, DoDs New Ex Gratia Policy: Whats Right, Whats Wrong, and Whats Next,
JUST SEC. (July 10, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71332/dods-new-ex-gratia-policy-whats-rightwhats-wrong-and-whats-next/; see also Thomas Gregory, The Costs of War: Condolence Payments and
the Politics of Killing Civilians, 46 REV. INTL. STUD. 156, 156 (2020) (discussing how condolence
payments objectify and devalue life and should be understood not as a humanitarian gesture that
recognizes victims suffering but rather as a weapon system aimed at securing specific military goals).
123. W. Michael Reisman, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J. INTL L. 381, 398 (1997).
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assessment that evaluates factors such as: (1) the foreseeability of harm to
potential victims; (2) the closeness of the connection between the perpetrators
conduct and the injuries suffered; (3) the moral blame attached to the
perpetrators activities; (4) the policy rationales of preventing future harms; (5)
the extent of the burden on the perpetrator and the consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise extra duties of care with resulting
liability for breach; (6) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved.124 Such social policy analysis is useful because it recognizes the
reality that punishing a defendant for conduct they cannot avoid at reasonable
cost will have either no effect or a bad (inefficient) effect.125
My proposed duty of care works from the assumption that holding
intelligence agencies to a basic reasonableness standardand continuously
monitoring compliancecould result in a reduction in risk to civilians without
unduly constraining a states ability to fight legitimate wars or to address real
threats to national security. After all, many of the duties described below are
already voluntarily implemented by intelligence agencies around the world
today.126 Putting a legal stamp over these principles will only enhance their
normative function and increase their effectiveness in deterring undesired
conduct. In other words, my proposal will make what is currently a non-binding
industry best practice standard into a binding rule with a corresponding duty
to compensate victims of violations.
Considering the six general factors for the introduction of new duties of
care, it would seem like the proposed duty will be efficient. The foreseeability
of harm from faulty intelligence is high, and the connection between the
perpetrators conduct and that harm is direct and indisputable. Moreover, there
are almost no existing insurance policies that would compensate the victims of
these attacks. Most victims live in areas of the world where insurance solutions
are limited and expensive. Even those lucky few with life and home insurance,
for example, will usually find a wartime exclusion that will deny them of
coverage.127 Guaranteeing the possibility of recovery for victims in cases
involving reprehensible loss is a core function of our international system. As
the U.N. General Assembly has recognized: victims should be treated with
compassion and respect for their dignity, have their right to access to justice and
redress mechanisms fully respected, and the establishment, strengthening and
expansion of national funds for compensation to victims should be encouraged,
together with the expeditious development of appropriate rights and remedies for

124. See, e.g., Bas v. Facebook, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Superior Ct., 413 P.3d 656, 669 (2018); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 565 (1968).
125. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 225 (1981).
126. LOWENTHAL, supra note 44, at 149-201 (discussing the various management techniques that
intelligence agencies currently employ to enhance the quality of analysis and assessment, including
training, competitive, collaborative, and alternative analysis, analytical standards, and models of
estimation).
127. For a general discussion of wartime exclusions in insurance policies see Adam B.
Shinderman, Prove It! Judging the Hostile-or-Warlike-Action Exclusion in Cyber-Insurance Policies, 129
YALE L.J. F. 64 (2019).
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victims.128
Introducing an intelligence-specific duty of care places the burden to
compensate on the targeting state for two related reasons. First, that state is the
least-cost avoider. Requiring states and the intelligence agencies they employ to
develop effective internal regulations, communication structures, qualityassurance frameworks, and oversight mechanisms is arguably the cheapest way
to mitigate the magnitudes of potential harms associated with wartime attacks
based on faulty intelligence. Moreover, the state is also typically the least-cost
bearer. The targeting state and its agencies are in a better position to investigate,
compensate, rehabilitate, and internalize the lessons of an intelligence failure
and to provide assurances of non-repetitionthan any other potential actor (say
an international organization, a commercial insurer, or a third country).
The following pages begin to outline this new duty of care. My aim here is
to offer an initial sketch that encourages intelligence officers, military
commanders and lawyers, human rights activists, and humanitarian professionals
to come together for a more robust dialogue over an intelligence-specific duty of
care under IHL. My hope is that this preliminary articulation could serve as a
starting point for this long overdue discussion.
i.

A Context-Based Duty of Care

Perfect information, whatever that term might mean, is not an attainable
goal in times of war.129 That is not to say, however, that there are no objective
criteria through which to determine appropriate and inappropriate methodologies
for intelligence processing, analysis, and verification. Nor does it mean that we
must accept all intelligence faults and errors in war as inevitable and thereby as
legally inconsequential. Instead, we should recognize that while partial
information is the coin of the realm, qualitatively more accurate and detailed
information should always be preferred, and on many occasions may be achieved
prior to the launching of an attack. The threshold of evidence necessary for
launching an aerial operation should be defined and examined by lawyers,
intelligence professionals, and military commanders.
In developing such a standard, it is important to clarify that no guideline
could be systematically applied to all wartime intelligence operations. Surely,
the verifications required may vary on the basis of context: the military,
intelligence, and technological capacities of the targeting state, and the nature of
the environment in which the operation is launched. This is what Gabriella Blum
once called Common-but-Differentiated Responsibilities.130 The ICRC

128. G.A. Res. 60/147 (Mar. 21 2006).
129. See Israel 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 326.
130. Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INTL. L.J. 164, 164 (2011).
Applying her concept of common-but-differentiated (CDR) responsibility specifically in the context of
precautions in attack, Blum writes that the principles impose substantially higher degrees of
responsibility on richer or more technologically advanced countries than on poorer ones. Id. at 194.
Richer countries have an obligation to spend more money on the deployment, procurement, or
development of better intelligence and might even be required to share intelligence or more precise
targeting technologies with less capable parties. Id. at 194.
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clarified this point:
Obviously, the standard of doubt applicable to targeting decisions cannot be
compared to the strict standard of doubt applicable in criminal proceedings but rather
must reflect the level of certainty that can reasonably be achieved in the
circumstances. In practice this determination will have to take into account, inter
alia, the intelligence available to the decision maker, the urgency of the situation,
and the harm likely to result to the operating forces or to persons and objected
protected against direct attack from an erroneous decision.131

Exploring the issue of urgency, as raised by the ICRC, we may wish to set
a different evidentiary requirement for real-time and time-sensitive operations
than for pre-planned strikes. For example, in the case of unanticipated fire from
a nearby building, immediate response would deny the forces access to realtime data regarding the presence of civilians or the nature of surrounding
structures. In such exigent circumstances, the platoon will have to rely on
whatever partial information it does have.132 Even in the context of aerial
strikes, there may be situations where urgency could be given priority. Think,
for example, of opportunity strikes, such as a missile launcher coming out of the
ground or a known terrorist operative coming out of hiding. These opportunities
leave militaries with a limited window to collect intelligence and launch a
responsive attack. On the whole, however, aerial strikes are typically planned
days, weeks, and sometimes months in advance. For these kinds of cases, where
the launching is decided in more ideal conditions, the evidentiary bar could be
significantly raised.133
As information is collected, Hampson provides a useful set of additional
considerations that focus on assessing the accuracy and reliability of the data.
She asks about the nature and source of the intelligence, how recent it was and
whether there was conflicting intelligence; also whether intelligence should have
been gathered from other sources, presumably to corroborate the findings.134
These are all questions of fact, rooted in an understanding of the available
resources and capacities at the disposal of the intelligence community at the time.
Answering them will require intimate knowledge as to whether additional or
contradictory information was easily obtainable within the practical time
constraints of mission execution.135
In response, we must shift the center of gravity for our factual analysis from
the commander to her intelligence officers. If we only examine what the
commander knew at the time the decision was made to determine compliance

131. INTL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTEROPERATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 76 (Nils Meltzer ed.,
2009).
132. See Israel 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, supra note 26, ¶ 327.
133. See also ICRC Expert Meeting Report, supra note 23, at 59 (distinguishing between preplanned operations and dynamic targeting, and noting that for the latter category of operations
proportionality assessments are also carried out but in a compressed timeframe, with less intelligence
and therefore not necessarily through the same processes).
134. See Hampson, supra note 72, at 97.
135. Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Targeting, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131, 163 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds.,
2007).
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with Article 57, then many operations that cause civilian harm will nevertheless
be deemed lawful, since commanders are too far removed from the intelligenceproduction phase to be expected to regulate it properly. Instead, this Article
suggests extending Article 57 to cover earlier phases in the targeting decision
making process by asking whether the states intelligence arms did everything
they could to verify targets and minimize harm.
In the next Part, I propose how we might be able to prove breaches of the
intelligence agencies now-extended duty to act in good faith and with due
diligence in the production of wartime intelligence.136
ii. Proving a Breach
The last decade has seen a rise in scholarly research on global
administrative law. At its core, the project turns to the general principles that are
common to most domestic administrative processes and makes the claim that
these principles are also a broader feature of transgovernmental regulations.137
In the context of intelligence gathering, then, we might look to identify certain
structural and procedural administrative safeguardsincluding transparency,
reason giving, and oversightthat could be used to determine the reasonableness
of the activities of the intelligence agency.
Within the limits of this Article, I want to offer two primary observations
about possible ways to prove a breach of an intelligence agencys duty of care.
In my view, the assessors of reasonableness would benefit from exploring
procedural faults in two areas of intelligence activity: a) verification and
deliberation, and b) documentation and transparency.
a. The Quality of Verification and Deliberation
Many intelligence failures occur due to an over-reliance on a single point
of data. This includes inaccurate maps, inconclusive drone footage, or a single
tip from an informant or third-party intelligence agency. The latter is common in
joint-targeting operations.
Reliance on a single source is often appealing to intelligence analysts. It
follows from the natural inclination towards the lex parsimoniae of Occams
razor. Multiple sources lead to conflicting evidence and to paradoxes that require
careful and painstaking work to resolve. Intelligence officers might act
negligently by simply succumbing to our human inclination towards the law of
parsimony and not work diligently enough to search for alternative answers.
The best way to break away from potential over-confidence and selection
bias is through deliberative and participatory processes. Such procedures should
welcome ingenuity and creativity and encourage members of the intelligence
community to challenge traditional conceptions. In certain casesor, arguably,

136. See DINSTEIN, supra note 76, at 139.
137. For further reading see, for example, Bendict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative
Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005).
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in most caseswe might prefer to have a group of analysts involved in
counterfactual reasoning, challenging each of the agencys assessment
propositions in the lead up to the publication of that assessment. Adopting such
basic requirements of verification is the only sure way to challenge the
politicized intelligence and groupthink mentalities that are troublingly prevalent
in military intelligence operations.
Relatedly, we have witnessed how the introduction of new surveillance
tools has triggered false confidence in these technologies as an alternative to a
more careful assessment of the facts. The Drone Papersa set of leaked topsecret reports from the Pentagon concerning Obama-era policies on targeting
offer one recent example. The Drone Papers reveal the critical shortfalls of
over-relying on GSM mobile networks as the primary basis for identifying the
location of targets prior to engaging them.138 If we turn phones into trackers, and
make targeting decisions solely on the basis of such limited signal intelligence,
we invite false positives, which means the possibility of harm to innocent
civilians.
Technology is never perfect; intelligence agencies must continually engage
in a careful development of human-rights-centric procedures that anticipate the
potential limitations of those technologies prior to their deployment across an
agency. Intelligence officers should be routinely trained on how to use these
technologies, what those technologies blind spots might be, and where they
might produce false positives. The dynamics between law and technology have
been described in the past as a sort of choreographed exchange.139 Just like any
other dance, the dance of law and technology requires years to perfect and
master. Over time, confidence might grow incrementally on the basis of a proven
track record. Nonetheless, in the early years, intelligence agencies must be
extremely cautious about the rapid adoption of new technological tools.140 For
example, in their contemporary forms, neither aerial surveillance nor signal
intelligence can serve as the sole basis for verification and justification of attacks.
Either of those sources must be corroborated by other intelligence before an
operation is authorized. It would not be a radical departure, then, to codify the
consensus that launching an attack only on the basis of one such source, or to
establish a more minimum, although rebuttable, presumption that such reliance
is insufficient. Such legal lines are important for determining unreasonable
mistakes and for assigning liability. At the same time, though, any standard
developed must evolve in light of ongoing changes in the technology. It could
very well be that future rule prescribers and rule appliers will view new
advancements in remote sensing, hacking, and communications interception as
138. See Cora Currier & Peter Maass, Firing Blind: Flawed Intelligence and the Limits of Drone
Technology, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 15, 2015), https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/firing-blind/.
139. Timothy R. Coughlin, The Future of Robotic Weaponry and the Law of Armed Conflict:
Irreconcilable Differences? 17 UCL JURIS. REV. 67, 67 (2011).
140. LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG, SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN & KEVIN J. SOO HOO, INFORMATION
WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1998) (No law can change, as swiftly as can technology; unless
law is to somehow stop technologys seemingly inexorable worldwide progress, it cannot fully control
the use of its fruits for warfare. Legal measures can thus supplement, but not supplant, vigilance,
preparedness, and ingenuity.).
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developments that necessitate the erasure of the sorts of lines drawn above.
What we have already seen, however, is that it is possible for assessors to
objectively analyze the quality of the deliberations and verifications that led to
the intelligence determinations that became the basis for an attack. By treating
intelligence production as a trade with a set of well-defined industry standards,
we may be able to rate the effectiveness of particular actors and policy choices.
Over time, this will result in the creation of actual benchmarks against which we
may be able to continuously assess new breachesultimately producing what
Ive called a common law of Article 57.
b. The Quality of Documentation and Transparency
Transparency plays an important function in ensuring that assessors can
oversee, examine, and review intelligence operations. After all, it is only possible
to determine ex post factum if a breach of a duty of care has occurred if there is
a verified trail of evidence to review. In reaching a conclusion as to the
reasonableness of an intelligence operation, it is critical to reexamine all of the
information that was relevant to the decision-making phase. Strict and welldefined rules must be adopted, then, to preserve a record of the various actions
and decisions that were made throughout the intelligence cycle. Officers must
also be trained about rules relating to chain of custody and their obligations to
preserve data before, during, and after each operation. Finally, states must go
beyond documentation and actually disclose relevant information about the
processes that led to the mistake, so that third-party assessors may review those
decisions.
Of course, some intelligence will have to be kept secret. It is also important
to acknowledge that secrecy is not per se unlawful141 and that some secrecy is
in fact necessary to ensure the efficacy of intelligence work. Nonetheless,
secrecy can easily be abused.142 As noted by David Pozen, in the absence of
perfect virtue, secrecy creates greater opportunities for officials to pursue
personal or partisan gain, to engage in logrolling or horse trading, and to commit
legal and ethical abuses. . . . Secrecy [of law, policy, and practice] exacerbates
the principal-agent problem inherent in representative democracy and opens the
door to tyranny.143
What is even more worrying from an international legal perspective,
however, is the devastating blow that secrecy deals to the international
constitutive process. In the absence of a codifying treaty, international regulation
in the form of custom is dependent on state practice to develop effectively.

141. W. MICHAEL REISMAN &. JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES,
CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW 141 (1992).
142. Hans Born & Aidan Wills, Beyond the Oxymoron: Exploring Ethics Through the
Intelligence Cycle, in 2 ETHICS OF SPYING: A READER FOR THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL 34, 36 (Jan
Goldman ed., 2010) (Ethical standards are of particular significance in the activities of intelligence
services due to the nature of work they conduct and the veil of secrecy under which much of their work
takes place. Furthermore, in even the most transparent democratic systems, it is feared that a proportion
of the work of intelligence services falls beyond the reach of both legislation and oversight bodies.).
143. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 278 (2010).
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Unfortunately, secretive state practice inherently prevents custom from evolving
under a positivist theory of the sources of international law. Steven Ratner has
defined it best:
The challenge to international lawyers posed by intelligence gathering is somewhat
daunting: How can international norms, processes, and institutions possibly play a
role in regulating an activity that by its very nature is so secret that states deliberately
reveal very little about how they carry it out?144

Operating without the compass of international custom, intrepid legal
advisors are forced to navigate a treacherous international legal terrain and
provide their states with often unsubstantiated answers to policy interpretations
of Article 57s requirements. In addition to its usefulness in establishing the
liability of the targeting state, then, releasing information about the intelligence
that led to certain targeting operations is normatively desirable for the
development of international law. Such disclosure is pivotal for the development
of an iterative process that could advance communal understanding of the duty
of care as it applies to changing factual situations and circumstances.
As IHL is currently construed, states have no obligation to publicize
information concerning the way intelligence was collected, processed, analyzed,
verified, or utilized.145 A duty of care that is sensitive to disclosures could help
incentivize transparency. Arguably, the more a state shows a willingness to
document violations, release information, internalize costs, protect
whistleblowers, and learn from its mistakes, the less likely it becomes that an
assessor would assign blameworthiness to its conduct. We saw a version of this
in the Central Front award of the Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission. In that
case, the arbitrators noted that all of the information critical for their Article
57 assessment was in the hands of Eritrea or could have been obtained by it.146
When Eritrea refused to disclose that information, the arbitrators, relying on the
Corfu Channel precedent, considered themselves entitled to draw adverse
inferences against Eritrea.
In response to those intelligence agencies that may be disinclined to release
such information, I would argue that security through secrecy is far less
beneficial than it may seem.147 Obviously, in the name of source protection and
operational readiness, not all information may be made public at all times.
Nonetheless, a states refusal to disclose even the most elementary information
creates an unnecessary delegitimizing stigma that is arguably exacerbated by the
flattening world of smartphones, whistleblowers, freedom of information
requests, and social media.148 Relatedly, from an administrative and rule-of-law

144. Steven R. Ratner, Introduction, 28 MICH. J. INTL L. 539, 539 (2007).
145. See Israel 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 286 n.438.
146. See Central Front Award, supra note 71, at 191.
147. Maure L. Goldschmidt, Publicity, Privacy and Secrecy, 7 WEST. POL. Q. 401, 410-11 (1954)
(The efforts to defend national security through secrecy are, in part at least, self-defeating. If everything
is classified, classification soon loses its significance for those who handle secret documents Even more
important are the effects of secrecy upon public opinion. The lack of reliable information increases fear
and uncertainty, and encourages rumor and the making of reckless and irresponsible charges.).
148. Reisman & Baker, supra note 141, at 143 (In contemplating any covert operation assume
that it will become public knowledge much sooner than you would like . The illusion of secrecy can
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perspective, agencies are understood to act differently when their policymaking
occurs in the light, rather than in the shadow.149
It is in this context that the Trump administrations decision to roll back an
Obama-era policy on disclosures of statistical data on civilian casualties from
airstrikes takes us backwards, not forward.150 As one commentator noted, aerial
strikes take place in an already troubling environment of enhanced secrecy
where the government, news organizations and human rights groups have
limited visibility, and the enemy has shown a propensity to attempt to manipulate
the information.151 The fact that the Biden administration has yet to establish a
clear policy for drone strikes is not reassuring,152 nor are the recent reports about
the mistaken targeting of Zemari Ahmadi, an aid worker, and seven children in
Afghanistan, concerning which the Pentagon has declined to admit fault.153
In addition, we should eliminate jurisdictional hindrances on the ability to
pursue further public discourse around targeting decisions. For example, in
August 2012, an American drone strike in Yemen killed Ahmed Salem bin Ali
Jaber, an imam who preached against al-Qaedas ideology. Salem was not the
target; the attack was aimed at three al-Qaeda members who Salem attempting
to persuade to leave the organization. One of Salems family members, Faisal
bin Ali Jaber, received a $100,000 condolence payment from the United States,
but no official apology or recognition of fault was ever provided by the U.S.
government. On June 30, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit dismissed a case brought by Ali Jaber as nonjusticiable. The Court argued
that it is the Executive, and not a panel of the D.C. Circuit, who commands our

provide a false and treacherous sense of security.).
149. See, e.g., LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLES MONEY 92 (1993) (Publicity is justly
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant;
electric light the most efficient policemen.); OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies on Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the_press_office/Transparency_and_Open_Govern
ment (In his first presidential directive upon taking office, President Obama noted: Government should
be transparent. Transparency promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about what
their Government is doing.).
150. Charlie Savage, Trump Revokes Obama-Era Rule on Disclosing Civilian Casualties from
U.S. Airstrikes Outside War Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/06/us/politics/trump-civilian-casualties-rule-revoked.html.
151. Id.
152. Zachary Cohen, Natasha Bertrand & Katie Bo Williams, Biden Administration Still
Weighing CIA Drone Strike Policy and Afghanistan Withdrawal, CNN (Jul. 5, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/05/politics/cia-drone-strike-afghanistan-suspected-terrorists/index.html.
Recent reports about a Biden Presidential Policy Memorandum that would set flexible standards for
targeting depending on the different settings across the world raises many concerns about the ability to
establish a baseline of minimum requirements. See Charlie Savage, Afghanistan Collapse and Strikes in
Somalia Raise Snags for Drone Warfare Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/08/28/us/politics/biden-drones.html.
153. Christoph Koettl et al., How a U.S. Drone Strike Killed the Wrong Person, N.Y. TIMES (Sep.
10,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/asia/100000007963596/us-drone-attack-kabulinvestigation.html; Lolita Baldor, Watchdog finds no misconduct in mistaken Afghan airstrike, AP News
(Nov. 3, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-kabul-bf24b4a670895ab1cc0b345ee9c90c74?
utm_source=Twitter&utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_medium=AP (An independent Pentagon
review has concluded that the U.S. drone strike that killed innocent Kabul civilians and children in the
final days of the Afghanistan war was not caused by misconduct or negligence, and it doesnt recommend
any disciplinary action.).
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armed forces and determines our nations foreign policy.154
Yet the Court was not actually being called to meddle in the way the
President commands the armed forces or runs foreign policy. Rather, the Court
was asked to acknowledge that modern-day, premeditated remote drone strikes
involve extensive intelligence production, which should be subject to substantive
legal discourse and legal interpretation. Such determinations are well within the
wheelhouse of the judiciary155 as the D.C. Circuit termed it. Courts are thus
well-equipped, not ill-equipped, to engage in these analyses and to assess the
legal standards adopted by the executive prior to launching such strikes.156 They
also offer an important venue through which to fight the phenomenon of
groupthink. If intelligence officers and military commanders knew that their pretargeting decisions could be the subject of potential public litigation later down
the line, they might be more cautious and provide more detailed reasoning during
deliberations and ahead of the authorization of strikes.157 IHLs expressive and
governance functions would therefore be enhanced.
C. Fitting the New Duty of Care Within Existing IHL
To develop a new duty of care, one need not seek a full amendment to the
Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocols. Instead, we may wish to explore
what Rebecca Crootof calls informal lawmaking. This process involves the
formulation of common understandings that are based on such sources as
international and transnational dialogue, nonbinding resolutions and
declarations, professional guidelines and codes of conduct, civil society reports
and policy briefs, industry practice, and even domestic laws and policies.158
Such sources, Rebecca Crootof claims, are likely to be both more
narrowly tailored and more flexible than treaty provisions, and thus better able
to address unanticipated technological breakthroughs.159 For example, an ICRC
interpretive guidance on the intelligence requirements under Article 57 could be
a useful first step. Such a report would mirror the now over-a-decade old ICRC
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, which
had a very generative effect on the discourse between states on the issue in the
early 2010s.

154. Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
155. Id.
156. For similar arguments see Joshua Andresen, Note, Due Process in the Age of Drones, 41
YALE J. INTL L. 155 (2016).
157. For further reading on the deterrence effect of litigation on the wartime decision-making of
politicians, military commanders, and rank and file soldiers see Haim Abraham, Combatant Activity, Tort
Liability, and the Question of Over-Deterrence (unpublished article) (on file with author); see also
Stephen I. Vladeck, Targeted Killing and Judicial Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 11, 28
([A]s the United States increasingly moves toward a paradigm in which use of force is based upon
individual determinations made thousands of miles away from any battlefield utilizing secret and
otherwise unreviewable criteria[,] . . . [relying on judicial review] may be the least-worst way to ensure
that something more than the constitutional and moral sensibilities of the incumbent Commander in Chief
circumscribes the United States use of lethal force, whether against its own citizens or others.).
158. See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1901-02 (2015).
159. Id.
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Similarly, agenda-setting sessions and reports by special procedures at the
Human Rights Council in Geneva offer another set of possible steps in informal
law-making. Academic responses to new media-grabbing wartime targeting
failures, which unfortunately are likely to continue to occur, could also help.
Such scholarly attention in real time may generate preliminary consensus and
further inspire the development of a more effective regulatory agenda. Finally,
international courts and tribunals could play a role here, as well. Judicial bodies
have had an undeniable impact on the development of IHL, chiefly through
clarifying the substance of existing rules and principles.160 If courts were to
progressively develop the meaning of Article 57, they could prompt the eventual
codification of the new duty of care.
In the long run, if a handful of countries took the initiative to develop
publicly facing military guidelines and codes of conduct on wartime intelligence
production, or hosted conferences to that effectespecially if they responded to
an incident involving their forces in a systematized, regulatory waysome
meaningful international momentum could begin to emerge.
III. CASE STUDIES: FAULTY INTELLIGENCE IN AERIAL STRIKES
The analysis of historical intelligence failures has been by far dominated
by intelligence studies scholars, and to a lesser extent by researchers in political
science and international relations.161 Lawyers have rarely entered the ring. As
early as 1984, Michael Reisman identified the reasons why international lawyers
tend to pay relatively little attention to the incidents from which political
advisers infer their normative universe.162 Reisman suggested that international
lawyers obsession with texts confines their attention to sources of international
law that were either merely ceremonial at their inception, or that, although
animated by more normative intentions when they were created, have ceased to
be congruent with expectations of authority and control held by effective
elites.163
In making a proposal for the further regulation of the intelligence function
in IHL, it is crucial to remember the lessons of previous attacks and to review
past examples of intelligence incidents with an eye to the future. In so doing we
will be able to derive from each incident norm-indicators and normgenerators164 that could further elucidate existing and future expectations. Such
an incident analysis could serve as a type of what Reisman has called metalaw, which provides normative guidelines for decisionmakers in the
160. SHANE DARCY, JUDGES, LAW, AND WAR: THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 314 (2014).
161. See, e.g., Richard K. Betts, Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are
Inevitable, 31 WORLD POL. 61 (1978); Erik Dahl, Missing the Wake-Up Call: Why Intelligence Failures
Rarely Inspire Improved Performance, 25 INTEL. & NATL SEC. 778 (2010); Eric Rosenbach, The Incisive
Fight: Recommendations for Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence, 618 THE ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACAD. 133 (2008).
162. W. Michael Reisman, The Incident as a Decisional Unit in International Law, 10 YALE J.
INTL L. 1, 4 (1984).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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international system in those vast deserts in which case law is sparse.165
Reisman did exactly that, in fact, in his 1997 comment The Lessons of
Qana, which explored the law and politics of a 1996 Israeli artillery strike at a
United Nations Compound in Southern Lebanon.166 The analysis included below
adopts a similar methodology to that employed by Reisman in that article.
A. Case Selection Criteria
The three selected case studies all involve faulty intelligence by a state
engaged in armed conflict. Each of the case studies also meets the following
criteria: (1) the targeting state admitted fault, (2) substantive evidence is
accessible to demonstrate the intelligence failures that lead to the incident, and
(3) the fault resulted in an otherwise unintended and unforeseen loss of civilian
life.167 Although many of the operations discussed in the case studies were
conducted in a clandestine manner, post-incident investigationsby the
targeting state, by international organizations, and by civil societyas well as
other legal action and responses, have all led to sufficiently accessible public
information about the incident, the faulty intelligence, and the parties involved
to allow for this inquiry. In this regard, it is important to reiterate that targeting
policies and operations, especially when confidential sources are concerned, tend
to involve a significant lack of transparency (especially outside of democratic
governments) which makes it difficult to identify relevant state practice.
The selected cases range temporally from World War II to 2014 and span
multiple continents and belligerent parties. In analyzing the case studies, I relied
on primary sources wherever possible, including press releases, official
investigations by governmental agencies, legal judgments and rulings, and
reports by intergovernmental international organizations. Other parts of the data
come from secondary sources, such as press reports and reports from civil
society, which sometimes contain unofficial allegations and speculations. The
analysis provided below does not aim to offer a full account of all possible case
studies that meet the inclusion criteria, nor does it represent the majority of cases
or all major cases. To the contrary, these are just a small sample of a possible
larger poolif not oceanof relevant examples. That said, this body of cases is
robust enough to highlight areas of potential correlation and similarity in the
application of the duty of care.

165. Id. at 19.
166. Reisman, supra note 123.
167. A long list of cases meets the preliminary criteria. They include, among others, Operation
Urgent Fury and the bombing of the Richmond Hill Mental Hospital (Oct. 25, 1983); the German attack
on tanker trucks outside the village of Haji Sakhi Dedby in the Kunduz Province of Afghanistan (Sept. 4,
2009); U.S. Special Forces helicopter attack in the Uruzgan province of Afghanistan (Feb. 21, 2010); the
Turkish Roboski Massacare in Uludere (Dec. 28, 2011); the Dutch airstrike against an alleged Islamic
State bomb factory in Northern Iraq (June 2, 2015); the U.S. attack on a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital
in the Kunduz province of Afghanistan (Oct. 3, 2015); the Saudi Arabian-led coalition strike on a funeral
hall in Sanaa, Yemen (Oct. 8, 2016); and the Nigerian bombing of Rann Refugee Camp (Jan. 17, 2017).
Within the limits of this Article, I could not address these cases as well. Nonetheless, the intelligence
faults depicted in each of the above cases mirrors many of the faults described in the four selected cases
and in that regard do not bear repeating.
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B. Analysis of Case Studies
i.

The Battle of Monte Cassino (February 15, 1944)
a. The Facts of the Case

The Battle of Monte Cassino is the collective name given to a series of
strikes that took place during the first five months of 1944. In four separate
assaults, the Allied Forces attempted to break through the German Gustav Line
by capturing the town and mountain of Cassino. The most tragic and
controversial of the four operations was the air campaign launched on February
15 against the Abbey of Monte Cassino. Founded in 526 by St. Benedict, this
site of cultural and religious importance was the most ancient house of the
Benedictines. The Abbey counts St. Thomas Aquinas among its early monks.
Although both sides had given an undertaking to the Pope to keep out of
the monastery and protect itand despite the fact that Germany had declared a
Neutral Zone of 300 yards around the Abbey in December 1943many in the
Allied forces refused to believe that the Germans would hold true to their word.
In reality, however, the local German Corps Commander, General Frido von
Senger und Etterlin, was a very devout Catholic and would never have breached
such an undertaking.168 General Getrie Tuker, the GCO of the 4th Indian
Division, who was tasked with the capture of the monastery, knew nothing of
von Senger and refused to accept that the Germans would stick to the
agreement, given the monasterys strategic natural defensive position.169
This political conception heavily influenced intelligence collection in the
days leading up to the operation. The British field marshal, General Harold
Alexander, who was unsure as to whether the Germans would or already had
occupied the monastery, set the tone for the entire operation in a note to his staff
that read: If there is any reasonable probability that the building is being used
for military purposes, General Alexander believes that its destruction is
warranted.170
Following General Alexanders directive, and given the growing belief
among top Allied military officials that Germans were actually occupying the
monasteryand more importantly that it is precisely for their use of the
monastery as an artillery observation point that the allied forces were unable to
breach the Gustav Line thus far171intelligence information was soon found to
support an operation. One of the main justifications for launching the attack came
in the form of a single intercepted communication from the German command.
168. Rupert Clarke, WITH ALEX AT WAR: FROM THE IRRAWADDY TO THE PO, 1941-1945, at 135
(2000). As von Senger und Etterlin himself explained later: Monte Cassino would never have been
occupied by [a German] artillery spotter. . . . [S]o conspicuous a landmark would be quite unsuitable as
an observation post. (Frido von Senger & Etterlin, NEITHER FEAR NOR HOPE 202 (1963).)
169. See Clarke, supra note 168, at 137 (2000). For more on strategic positions, see John Ezard,
Error Led to Bombing of Monte Cassino, GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2000), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2000/apr/04/johnezard.
170. See Nigel De Lee, Moral Ambiguities in the Bombing of Monte Cassino, 4 J. MIL. ETHICS
129, 131 (2005).
171. Id.
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In the communication, a parachute commander had been heard asking: Ist Abt
Kloster?172 He was answered, Ja in Kloster mit Mönchen.173
The intelligence officer who intercepted the communication translated it as
the following: Is the HQ in the Abbey? The officer then recorded the answer
as yes without acknowledging the rest of the sentence.174 The officer did not
only fail to record the entire answer, he also wrongly interpreted the word Abt
which he understood as an abbreviation for Abteil (a battalion or unit) rather
than Abbot, the head of the monastery.175 It was not until Colonel Hunt asked
to see the entire intercept that the Allied forces realized that the actual answer on
the call was, Yes, the Abbot is with the monks in the Monastery. By that point,
however, it was already too late.176 The attack resulted in severe civilian
casualties. As noted by General Clarke of the U.S. 5th Army: Rather than saving
lives, that bombing would lead to savage losses and the deaths of many refugees
who had been sheltering in the monastery.177
In early February, days before the decision to launch the attack, an
American Air Force general, Ira C. Eaker, flew over the monastery for a
reconnaissance mission. He claimed that he thought he saw German military
personnel inside the enclosure (German uniforms hanging on a clothesline in
the abbey courtyard; [and] machine gun placements 50 yards from the abbey
walls.).178 Major General Geoffrey Keyes of U.S. II Corps flew over the
monastery several times before and after Eakers flight. He claimed he saw no
evidence of German presence in the monastery and rejected Eakers account
entirely: Theyve been looking so long, theyre seeing things.179
But it was not just military officials who set the zeitgeist for a Nazi invasion
into Monte Cassino. [A]llied leaders exploited the belief that Monte Cassino
was occupied to prepare opinion for aerial attacks on it. On February 11four
days before the bombingthe Daily Mail ran an army-inspired lead story, Nazis
Turn Cassino Monastery into Fort.180 On February 14, Allied guns fired leaflets
over the area warning that, in view of the German occupation, with very heavy
hearts we are going to have to turn our weapons on the abbey.181
In total, 250 civilians seeking refuge in the monastery were killed during
the February 15 attack. No German troops were present at the site.182 After the
bombing, however, German paratroopers were ordered to use the ruins of the
monastery as a defensive position and observation post, which in turn caused

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Clarke, supra note 168, at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Clarke, supra note 168, at 137.
Id.
See David Richardson & David Hapgood, MONTE CASSINO: THE STORY OF THE MOST
CONTROVERSIAL BATTLE OF WORLD WAR II 185 (2002); Matthew Parker, MONTE CASSINO: THE
HARDEST-FOUGHT BATTLE OF WORLD WAR II 173 (2003).
179. See Richardson & Hapgood, supra note 176, at 169.
180. See Ezard, supra note 170.
181. Id.
182. Id.; see also Richardson & Hapgood, supra note 178, at 212, 225.
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greater disadvantage to the Allied Forces and prolonged the battles over Monte
Cassino. Luigi Maglione, the Popes Cardinal Secretary of State perfectly
summarized the events at Monte Cassino as a colossal blunder[,] . . . a piece of
a gross stupidity.183 Even in the face of growing international criticism, General
Alexander remained unfazed. As Rupert Clarke writes, Alexander would
simply quote the well-understood principle that no commander could hesitate
between destroying a building, no matter how famous or even holy, if it was
occupied by the enemy and the lives of his soldiers were thereby put at risk.184
b. Applying the Duty of Care
The statement by General Alexander exemplifies that intelligence faults
may not always trigger self-reflection and self-correction. Instead, at times such
faults result in leaders doubling down, ignoring mistakes, and reaffirming their
faulty practiceshence the need for external regulation.
In fact, there were many pieces of intelligence at play in the Monte Cassino
incident. The problem was that most of the accurate intelligence was cast aside,
so as to preference intelligence that supported the desired narrative that Germans
were occupying the monastery. This included an exaggerated report by an Italian
civilian of sightings of guns, telescopes, and troop movements at the monastery,
as well as a report from an enemy prisoner of war that German troops were in
the abbey on hill 468 (the Abbey was actually on hill 516).185
It is not uncommon for intelligence analysts to suffer from over-confidence
biases, in which new information is evaluated in ways that reassert and reaffirm
previous conceptions. This is caused in part by the anchoring effect
phenomenon, whereby people utilize previous information when processing new
information, even when the previous information should be deemed irrelevant.186
The Monte Cassino case thus demonstrates how anchoring effects, overconfidence biases, groupthink mentality and politicized intelligence can result in
intelligence errors that put the lives of civilians in danger.
Under existing legal frameworks, the Allies would have no obligation to
compensate for the harm associated with the destruction of the site and the deaths
of the refugees.187 Extending Article 57 to cover the chain of faults surrounding
intelligence production in the context of this case would lead to a different
conclusion, though. Given the particularly sensitive cultural and religious nature
of the site in question, and the undertakings given to the Pope, the threshold for
what sufficient intelligence means in the context of launching this operation
should have been heightened. Similarly, the processes by which intelligence

183. Richardson & Hapgood, supra note 177, at 227.
184. Clarke, supra note 168, at 135.
185. Rogers, supra note 73, at 133.
186. See Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV. INTL L.J.
421, 429-30 (2014); Edward J. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic
Inference in Auditing, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 120 (1981).
187. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 73, at 133 (concluding that the operation did not violate
principles of precautions and proportionality).
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assessment were scrutinized and verified needed to be more robust.188 The
Allies failure to meet a contextualized duty of care would have resulted in an
obligation to compensate for this internationally wrongful act.
ii. The Attack on the Chinese Embassy (May 7, 1999)
a. The Facts of the Case
Operation Belgrade Warehouse 1 was aimed against a Yugoslav
Government agency (Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and
Procurement, or Yugoimport FDSP), suspected by the CIA of being involved
in arms proliferation and procurement. On the night of May 7, 1999, NATO B2 stealth bombers fired several missiles that hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade,
which had been mistakenly identified as the Yugoimport FDSP building. Three
Chinese citizens were killed and fifteen others were injured. The strike also
caused severe damage to the embassy building.189 The Chinese immediately
condemned the strike, calling it a barbaric attack and a gross violation of
Chinese sovereignty and of the U.N. Charter.190
Following a month-long investigation, U.S. Undersecretary of State
Thomas Pickering provided an oral explanation to the Chinese government on
June 17, 1999. According to Pickering, the bombing resulted from three basic
failures. First, the technique used to locate the intended target, the headquarters
of the [FDSP], was severely flawed. The technique, which involves
comparison of addresses from one street to another were totally inappropriate
for precision targeting. Second, none of the military or intelligence databases
used to verify information contained the correct location of the Chinese
Embassy. In fact, the database reviews conducted by the European Command
were limited to validating the target data sheet coordinates with the information
put into the database by [U.S. National Intelligence Mapping Agency] analysts.
This resulted in a circular process that negated the ability of the U.S. and
European Command to uncover the original error and made them both
susceptible to a single point of database failure. Third, ultimately, nowhere in
the target verification process were these issues identified, nor was anyone with
accurate on-the-ground knowledge contacted.191 Pickering concluded by
offering immediate ex gratia payments to those individuals who were injured in
the bombing and to the families of those killed, based on current experience
internationally for the scale of such payments.192
In additional review processes, CIA Director George Tenet concluded after
188. This view also reflects Adil Haques conceptualization of the precautions principle.
According to him, soldiers must take extra precautions unless doing so will increase their overall
marginal risk substantially more than doing so will decrease the overall marginal risk to civilians. ADIL
AHMAD HAQUE, LAW AND MORALITY AT WAR 170-71 (2017).
189. See ICTY Expert Committee Report, supra note 65, at ¶ 80.
190. See Europe NATO Hits Chinese Embassy, BBC NEWS (May 8, 1999),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/338424.stm.
191. See Sean D. Murphy, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  VOLUME 1:
1999-2001, at 100 (2002).
192. Id.
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reviewing the incident that there were people at the CIA and at the Department
of Defense who had an intimate understanding of the Belgrade environment, but
they were not consulted in this process.193 An Expert Committee was also
convened at the request of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal
of the Former Yugoslavia to examine NATOs aerial operation. The Expert
Committees report concluded that neither the U.S. aircrew involved in the attack
nor the senior leadership who authorized it should be assigned any criminal
responsibility, since they were provided with wrong information.194 The report
further noted the fact that NATO and the U.S. government issued a formal
apology and accepted full responsibility, including through the payment of $28
million in compensation to the Chinese Government and $4.5 million to the
families of those killed or injured.195 The CIA also dismissed one intelligence
officer and reprimanded six senior managers while taking corrective actions
in order to prevent mistakes such as this from occurring in the future.196
b. Applying the Duty of Care
The U.S. admission of its mistakes and its disclosure of its faulty
procedures, despite being a fairly direct product of public pressure, is admirable.
Again, we see mistakes in the processing and decoding phases of the intelligence
cycle; that is, in the translation of raw data into easily accessible materials for
both intelligence analysts and later military commanders and policy makers.
Yet what is worrisome from an accountability perspective is the Expert
Committees attitude towards ex gratia payments, internal admonishments, and
diplomatic apologies. The Committee seemed to find these actions sufficient to
exonerate a state and its officials and to abrogate any formal international
responsibility. Again, this is a shortcoming of placing the onus of responsibility
on the commander. It is perhaps true that the U.S. aircrew and senior leadership
are not to blame, for they were provided with wrong information, but those
who provided the information also had due diligence obligations. For the
omissions of its intelligence analysts, the U.S. should nonetheless be held
internationally responsible. That is in essence what an extension of Article 57
would entail in practice.
The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade further highlights yet
another key feature in the design of an effective intelligence gathering system:
the topic of intelligence sharing between coalition partners and within
international organizations. The fact that European Command relied on U.S.
databases to validate U.S. targets resulted in a circular process, where one
intelligence agency that was in a position to serve as a check on the power of
another was unable to do so. An expansion of Article 57 could capture these
intelligence sharing arrangements, and where certain conditions are met could

193. William M. Arkin, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 51
(2002).
194. See ICTY Expert Committee Report, supra note 65, at ¶ 85.
195. Id. at ¶ 84.
196. Id.
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even result in joint liability.197
iii. Operation Protective Edge and the Gaza Beach Attack (July 16,
2014)
a. The Facts of the Case
Operation Protective Edge took place from July 7 to August 26, 2014. It
was yet another round of intense hostilities between Israel and Hamas and
various other armed groups. The first phase of the operation involved an
extended aerial campaign launched by Israel to degrade the military capacity of
Hamas and the other organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially by halting or
significantly reducing the organizations capacity to launch rockets.198 One of
the most controversial aerial strikes conducted during Israels campaign resulted
in the death of four children, aged 9 to 11 years, on one of Gazas beaches. The
attack, which occurred on July 16, 2014, immediately sparked international
controversy, in part due to the beachs proximity to a hotel where international
journalists were staying.
The Israeli Military Advocate Generals (MAG) office led an internal
investigation of the incident. The investigation concluded that the children were
killed from the Israeli strike. Nonetheless, the MAG ordered on June 11, 2015,
that the investigation file be closed without any further legal proceedings 
criminal or disciplinary  to be taken against those involved in the incident.199
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner, the Israeli Defense Forces spokesman,
published an official statement summarizing the findings of that investigation.
According to Lerner, the compound in question spans the length of the
breakwater of the Gaza City seashore, closed off by a fence and clearly separated
from the beach serving the civilian population. It further found in the course of
the investigation (including from the affidavits provided by Palestinian
witnesses), that the compound was known to the residents of the Gaza Strip as a
compound which was used exclusively by Hamass Naval Police.200 The
investigation concluded that the decision to launch the attack was based on two
pieces of information. First, shortly before the incident, an intelligence
assessment was established which indicated that operatives from Hamass Naval
Forces would gather in the military compound in order to prepare for military
activity against the IDF.201 Second, on 16 July, aerial surveillance identified a
197. For general reading on the responsibility of individual members for violations of
international law through intelligence cooperation, see HANS BORN ET AL., MAKING INTERNATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION ACCOUNTABLE (2015); see also Marko Milanovic, Intelligence Sharing in
Multinational Military Operations and Complicity under International Law, 97 INTL L. STUD. 1269
(2021).
198. See Israel 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 82.
199. See Lt. Col. Peter Lerner, FACEBOOK (June 11, 2015), https://m.facebook.com/
Lt.Col.PeterLerner/photos/a.801798706527757/977554298952196; see also ISRAEL MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Operation Protective Edge: Investigation of exceptional incidents - Update 4, (June
11, 2015), https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/Operation-Protective-EdgeInvestigation-of-exceptional-incidents-Update-4.aspx.
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number of figures entering the compound at a running pace. These figures
entered a shed adjoining the container which had been attacked the day prior.
Against the backdrop of the aforementioned intelligence assessment, these were
believed to be militants from Hamass Naval Forces.202 It should be stressed
that the figures were not identified at any point during the incident, as
children.203
Not everyone agrees with this narrative of the attack and the events that
preceded it.204 However, even assuming for the purposes of this analysis that this
is an accurate depiction of the entire incident, we will still encounter a series of
intelligence faults in the assessment stage. First, an erroneous intelligence
assessment anticipated a meeting of Hamas naval operatives that never took
place; second, a misguided determination found that the compound was vacant
of civilian presence both generally and at the time the operation was authorized;
finally, four young children were identified as Hamas militants.
b. Applying the Duty of Care
This case brings to the forefront two primary root causes for intelligence
analysis deficits in the context of aerial targeting. The first concerns an overreliance on aerial surveillance as a primary source for intelligence leading up
to and during the operation. The Israeli official noted that: [I]t would not have
been possible for the operational entities involved to have identified these
figures, via aerial surveillance, as children and that the attack was carried out
while undertaking several precautionary measures, . . . [including] the
deployment of real time visual surveillance.205 The official thus seems to think
that under existing interpretation of Article 57, these two facts vindicate Israel
from liability. Under my proposed duty of care, that would no longer be the case.
If it is the indeed true that the identity of the children could not be established
solely on the basis of aerial surveillance, then until the technology advances,
aerial surveillance simply cannot be the only basis for a verification scheme
that meet IHLs requirements. Relying on this single point of data to affirm the
presence of Hamas navy officers in the vicinity is insufficient. Recall that Article
57 requires further intelligence collection whenever there is even the slightest of
doubts.206
A second issue worth highlighting concerns signature strikes. This
American term refers to the targeting of individuals solely on the basis of their
intelligence signatures  patterns of behavior that are detected through signals
intercepts, human sources, and aerial surveillance.207 As Spencer Ackerman has
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. For a summary of some of the contradicting views, see Peter Beaumont, Israel Exonerates
Itself over Gaza Beach Killing of Four Children Last Year, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/11/israel-clears-military-gaza-beach-children.
205. See Lerner, supra note 203.
206. See 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 63, and accompanying text.
207. See Greg Miller, White House Approves Broader Yemen Drone Campaign, WASH. POST
(Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-approvesbroader-yemen-drone-campaign/2012/04/25/gIQA82U6hT_story.html.
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explained in The Guardian, the problem with intelligence signatures is that:
[The] signatures at issue are indicators that intelligence analysts associate with
terrorist behaviorin practice, a gathering of men, teenaged to middle-aged,
traveling in convoys or carrying weapons. In 2012, an unnamed senior official
memorably quipped that the CIA considers three guys doing jumping jacks a
signature of terrorist training.208

The Israeli official made sure to include in his public statement the fact that
the group of figures entered the compound at a running pace. Runs, jumping
jacks, and skips cannot be the basis for a decision to launch an aerial targeting
operation. Reliance on such circumstantial evidence derived often
predominantly from VISINT does not meet what Ahron Barak called a heavy
burden of proof for the thorough verification of targets under Article 57.209
Taken as a whole, the reliance on a single source (a muted aerial imagery) in an
attempt to derive circumstantial patterns of behavior generated the
misconception and led to the failure in verification. Under a new duty of care,
reliance on such limited evidence would be deemed unreasonable and would
therefore trigger liability.
C. Looking Beyond History: Futureproofing IHL
The above case studies all illustrate the pivotal role that intelligence plays
in wartime decision-making for targeting purposes. In each scenario, various
faults in processing and analysis and an over-reliance by military commanders
and intelligence officers alike on a few questionable sources seem to have been
the primary human errors that caused tragedies.
Undoubtedly, all military commanders and all intelligence officers are
prone to such errors, but these cases indicate a troubling prospect: the increasing
role of surveillance technology and emerging means of communication as a new
source of errors. The process of translating and transferring information from
one intelligence actor to another and to a policy maker, from machine to person,
and then from person to person is where many of the errors discussed have
materialized.210
The notion that, as the ICRC has articulated, todays war pilots do not
necessarily see the target, and their bombs strike targets whose coordinates have
been pre-programmed, reflects an automated battlefield that may only
exacerbate the likelihood of mistakes.211 Additionally, intelligence communities
are run on the basis of a complex network of systems, agencies, and
organizations (both domestic and transnational). Such networks may allow
cross-checking to improve accuracy. Nonetheless, as the Chinese Embassy case
208. See Spencer Ackerman, Inside Obamas Drone Panopticon: A Secret Machine with No
Accountability, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2015), www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/25/us-droneprogram-secrecy-scrutiny-signature-strikes.
209. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel. v. Israel, ¶ 40, (2005) (Isr.).
210. See, e.g., M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction,
ENGAGING SCI., TECH., AND SOCY (2016) (pre-print available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757236) (discussing situations where miscommunications between human
beings and machine systems resulted in preventable accidents).
211. See ICRC Expert Meeting Report, supra note 23, at 59.
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demonstrates, they may equally serve to compound problems and open the door
for even further mistakes.
We are about to enter a new age in targeting, where intelligence officers
will rely more heavily on artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. As
Paul Maxwell has argued, AI will be utilized to carry out tasks such as
identifying a T-90 main battle tank in a satellite image, identifying high-value
targets in a crowd using facial recognition, translating text for open-source
intelligence, and text generation for use in information operations.212 For
example, the Pentagons Project Maven is set to incorporate computer vision
and AI algorithms into intelligence collection cells that would comb through
footage from uninhabited aerial vehicles and automatically identify hostile
activity for targeting.213 Similarly, a project by the U.S. Joint Artificial
Intelligence Center (JAIC) is working to develop algorithms for multilingual
speech recognition and translation in noisy environments, geo-locating images
without the associated metadata, fusing 2-D images to create 3-D models, and
building tools to infer a buildings function based on pattern-of-life analysis.214
If this is the future of wartime intelligence production, we must be
cognizant of AIs two most common characteristics: limited explainability and a
lack of predictability.215 The reasonable intelligence agency, then, is an agency
that protects standards of verification, deliberation, documentation, and
transparency even in the face of new technological innovations. It is the kind of
agency that will require human rights impact assessment at every stage of the
development and deployment of these new intelligence tools. It is also the kind
that will train its intelligence professionals to anticipate the blind spots and
shortfalls of these predictive and algorithmic technologies, so as not to become
subordinate to them. Such a duty of care could failproof IHL from the hazards
of a turbulent technological future.
CONCLUSION
In the ancient world, war chiefs relied on mysticism in developing their
grand military plans. These officeholders sought the help of oracles and
soothsayers, calling on them to predict the outcomes of tactical and strategic
military maneuvers and operations.216 The oracles often hedged their bets by
giving obscure and even deliberately ambiguous answers.217 The Pythia in the
Temple of Apollo at Delphi, for example, the most prestigious and authoritative
oracle amongst the Greeks,218 was particularly known for providing her
212. Paul Maxwell, Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You
Think), MOD. WAR INST. (Apr. 4, 2020), https://mwi.usma.edu/artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-justnot-way-think/.
213. Artificial Intelligence and National Security, CONG. RES. SERV. 10 (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf.
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216. See KEITH ELLIS, PREDICTION AND PROPHECY 17 (1973) (In the ancient world, generals
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217. Id. at 19.
218. See generally WILLIAM J. BROAD, THE ORACLE: ANCIENT DELPHI AND THE SCIENCE

2022]

The Reasonable Intelligence Agency

163

followers with polysemic prose.219 After bathing in and drinking from the waters
of the Castalian spring, the Pythia burned bay fronds and barley on an altar and
then mounted her holy tripod. As the priestess ascended into her mantic state,
gazing into a dish of Kassotis spring water and laurel leaves, she began uttering
her prophecies.220 Some authors claim this traditional process was a mere coverup for a sort of self-induced frenzy, the result of a combination of intoxicating
fumes and potent gases that rose into the temple from cracks in its bedrock. These
brought about a trancelike state, in which the oracle would moan and wail. The
temples priests and Hosioi (noble Delphians who attended the Pythia)221 would
interpret her wild cries according to an agreed-upon code.222
In modern warfare, commanders demand for foresight has only
increased.223 While generals no longer turn to oracles, they continue to search
for divine certainty amidst the tormenting fog of war. It is in this context that
intelligence analysts have become our contemporary prophets. Their chairs and
desks are their tripods, their computers their barley leaves. Instead of clay dishes
filled with spring water, they have satellite dishes, intercepted underwater cables,
and other surveillance and reconnaissance devices. Like the Pythia of Delphi,
they, too, reach a genuine state of ecstasynot one induced by illegal substances
(so we hope), but rather a spiritual elevation achieved by a series of small,
seemingly meaningless cathartic moments of intelligence puzzle piecing. And
much in the same way that the military chiefs of old accepted the prophecies of
oracles as the spoken word of god, so are our modern commanders susceptible
to embracing intelligence memoranda, and their authors deductive reasoning, as
a reflection of some form of celestial divination.224
This Article argues that intelligence regulation is a prerequisite for the
protection of the goals of IHL. Intelligence is a unique profession that does not
fit neatly into the dichotomy that exists between military action (the exercise of
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hard power) and diplomacy (the exercise of soft power).225 It is a realm in which
existing treaties and legal regimes are replaced by the more perverse set of
norms and rules which appear to govern intelligence activities.226 So far,
international law has taken an all-or-nothing approach to the development of
wartime intelligence standards, with a bias towards doing nothing. However, just
as intelligence practices continue to evolve, our conceptual understanding must
be flexible, tooelastic, non-conforming, adjustable along a spectrum. A dutyof-care standard offers such flexible regulation and indeed may be easily
embedded into our existing IHL frameworks. This Article should thus be seen as
a call for action, inviting intelligence officers to join an ongoing debate around
the future interpretation of the laws of armed conflict.
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